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2010 NOTE OF THE YEAR
THE LEGACY OF
GRANHOLM V. HEALD:
QUESTIONING THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
FACIALLY NEUTRAL
DIRECT-SHIPPING LAWS
So I dreamed: Wouldn’t it be terrific if I could be the heroine
who stems the tide, slows the overwhelming production of
hormonally overblown or sanitized wines—the ones that the
world’s most famous wine critic is credited with
championing? If only I could stop the proliferation of foursquare wines with utterly no sense of place or minerality that
reflect nothing about where they come from.1
APÉRITIF
The wine industry is bifurcating. On the one hand, producers are
consolidating and creating more similar-tasting wines. In 2007,
approximately eleven percent of U.S. wineries produced ninety-eight
percent of U.S. wine.2 In fact, half of the total wine market consists of
just twenty-two brand names.3 Some people believe these ubiquitous
ALICE FEIRING, THE BATTLE FOR WINE AND LOVE: OR HOW I SAVED THE WORLD
PARKERIZATION 3 (2008). The eponymous wine critic Robert M. Parker, Jr. has become
so influential that many vintners have altered their winemaking techniques to suit his palate.
This trend is called the ―Parkerization‖ of wine; it is also known as the ―international style‖ of
winemaking. E.g., Bill Daley, A Sense of Place: As International Style Homogenizes Wine,
Many Still Defend Terroir, CHI. TRIB., July 13, 2005, § 7, at 8.
2 Family Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins, No. 06-11682-RWZ, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
112074, at *23 (D. Mass. Nov. 19, 2008), aff’d, 592 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010).
3 KEVIN ZRALY, WINDOWS ON THE WORLD: COMPLETE WINE COURSE 2 (2010 ed. 2009).
1
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wines taste ―sanitized‖ in part because winemakers have taken to
chemically manipulating their wines to achieve higher rankings from
critics, and thus higher sales.4 But while the big producers have gotten
bigger, there has also been a proliferation of small start-up wineries.5
In 1975, the United States had fewer than 580 wineries; today it
boasts over 5,900.6 These smaller vintners are trying to ―stem the
tide‖ by producing more nuanced, boutique wines in smaller
quantities. The Federal Trade Commission attributes the dramatic
growth of boutique wineries to an increased demand for
―individualistic, hand-crafted wines.‖7
This backlash against the mass production and homogenization of
wine is noteworthy because it reflects the venerable belief that wine‘s
nuance and diversity are what make it such a poetic and enduring
drink. This philosophy—that no two wines could, or should, taste
alike—stems from the concept of terroir, a French term that
encompasses a grape‘s ―growing area, starting with the soil (la terre)
and the slope, and taking into account other elements of the
vineyard‘s microclimate, such as sun, rain, wind, and temperature
fluctuations. Each terroir produces a unique wine . . . .‖8 In addition
to terroir, ―[v]ariations in varietal designation, vintage year, vineyard
location, varietal blending, winemaking style and limitations on
availability [also] contribute to wine‘s uniqueness.‖9 As a result of
this uniqueness, ―[w]ines are not fungible.‖10
The fact that oenophiles enjoy exploring wine‘s diversity helps
explain why U.S. wineries currently produce 25,000 different wines.11
But because alcohol is heavily regulated, consumer access to this vast
array of wines is artificially limited. It can be difficult—if not
4 For example, Enologix Systems provides winemakers with ―wine quality metrics‖ that
help them improve the rankings their wines receive from critics. Enologix can also compare a
wine‘s ―flavor chemistry profile‖ to those of wines that have received high scores from
influential critics. ENOLOGIX SYSTEMS, http://www.enologix.com (last visited Oct. 16, 2010);
see also FEIRING, supra note 1, at 1–5.
5 Susan C. Cagann, Contents Under Pressure: Regulating the Sales and Marketing of
Alcoholic Beverages, in SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONTROL OF ALCOHOL: THE 21ST
AMENDMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY 57, 70 (Carole L. Jurkiewicz & Murphy J. Painter eds.,
2008).
6 ZRALY, supra note 3, at 61.
7 FED. TRADE COMM‘N, POSSIBLE ANTICOMPETITIVE B ARRIERS TO E-COMMERCE: WINE
6 (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/07/winereport2.pdf.
8 TYLER COLMAN, WINE POLITICS: HOW GOVERNMENTS, ENVIRONMENTALISTS,
MOBSTERS, AND CRITICS INFLUENCE THE WINES WE DRINK 42 (2008).
9 John A. Hinman & Robert T. Wright, Jr., Free Commerce in Wine: Trapped in a Legal
Web, HINMAN & CARMICHAEL LLP, 4 (June 23, 2000), http://www.beveragelaw.com/archives
/wlf%20article%20062300%20publication.pdf.
10 Id.
11 James Alexander Tanford, E-commerce in Wine, 3 J.L. ECON. & POL‘Y 275, 303
(2007).
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impossible—for a consumer to purchase a particular wine, especially
one from a boutique winery.12 Wineries, consumers, and advocacy
groups have begun challenging a variety of state laws that, they
contend, unconstitutionally restrict their ability to sell and purchase
wine.13 They point to wine‘s uniqueness to help explain why state
restrictions on the distribution of wine are particularly unacceptable.14
Most states regulate alcohol through a three-tier distribution
system, which generally requires suppliers (whether a brewer, vintner,
distiller, or importer—the first tier) to sell only to wholesalers (also
known as distributors or shippers—the second tier) who, in turn, may
sell only to retailers (including liquor stores, restaurants, and bars—
the third tier).15 Over the past few decades, as producers have
multiplied, wholesalers have consolidated, creating an hourglassshaped system with wholesalers at the point of constriction.16
Consequently, the three-tier system has become a huge impediment to
consumer choice.
What started out as a system to allow controlled and
regulated distribution has become its major obstacle.
Of the 25,000 wines, only about 500 make it through the
system to retail shelves. . . . Fewer than 100 wineries have
stable national distribution in any form. Three thousand
wineries have no wholesaler at all.17

12 See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM‘N, supra note 7, at 18. The FTC conducted a study in
McLean, Virginia, tracking the price and availability of the country‘s most popular wines. It
found that eighteen percent of the wines on its list were not available in bricks-and-mortar stores
near McLean, compared with only five percent unavailable over the Internet. And of the wines
that were not available in the McLean area, fifty-three percent of them were on Wine and Spirits
magazine‘s top-twenty most popular list. Id.
13 Groups such as the Coalition for Free Trade, Free the Grapes, the Wine Institute, and
Family Winemakers of California support litigation and legislation in this arena. A number of
journalists and academics have dubbed these legal challenges the ―Wine Wars.‖ See, e.g., Susan
Lorde Martin, Wine Wars—Direct Shipment of Wine: The Twenty-First Amendment, the
Commerce Clause, and Consumers’ Rights, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 1 (2000); Eryn Brown, The Wine
Wars, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2003, at BU4.
14 See, e.g., Cherry Hill Vineyards, LLC v. Hudgins, 488 F. Supp. 2d 601, 617 (W.D. Ky.
2006) (―We note that wine is a unique product. Accordingly, we agree with the plaintiffs
that . . . the effect on interstate commerce is not de minimus.‖), aff’d sub nom. Cherry Hill
Vineyards, LLC v. Lilly, 553 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 2008).
15 DOUGLAS GLEN WHITMAN, STRANGE BREW: ALCOHOL AND GOVERNMENT
MONOPOLY 5 fig.1 (2003).
16 Family Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins, 592 F.3d 1, 5–6 (1st Cir. 2010). The
consolidation of the wholesaler tier has been quite significant. In the 1950s, there were several
thousand wholesalers; today, there are only a few hundred. FED. TRADE COMM‘N, supra note 7,
at 6.
17 Tanford, supra note 11, at 303 (footnote omitted).
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But despite this effect of the three-tier system, the Supreme Court
continues to believe that it is ―unquestionably legitimate.‖18 Although
some practitioners and scholars believe that the Court‘s opinion of the
three-tier system may change in the future, the system remains
constitutional for the time being.19
Now that each state is home to at least one winery,20 however, the
states themselves want to do something about the bottleneck created
by the three-tier system. Allowing producers to sell wine over the
Internet and ship it directly to their customers is an obvious
alternative to wholesale distribution. One way for a state to support its
burgeoning wine industry while appeasing its powerful wholesalers21
is to create an exception to its three-tier system that allows in-state
wineries to ship directly while continuing to require out-of-state
wineries to sell only to wholesalers. Advocates of direct shipping
have taken to challenging these exceptions as an alternative to
attacking the three-tier system as a whole. While this strategy may
seem counterintuitive, it may actually help expand direct shipping—at
least in some states. The goal is that courts will declare these
exceptions unconstitutional because they discriminate in favor of the
state‘s own wineries and that state legislatures will respond by
extending direct-shipping privileges to out-of-state wineries—as
opposed to revoking them from the in-state wineries.
In the landmark case Granholm v. Heald,22 for example, the
plaintiffs challenged a Michigan law that allowed in-state wineries to
sell directly to Michiganders via the Internet, but prevented out-ofstate wineries from doing the same. The plaintiffs argued that this law
violated the dormant Commerce Clause by discriminating against outof-state wineries. Prior to Granholm, it was unclear whether the
Twenty-First Amendment, which gives states broad authority to
18 Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 489 (2005) (quoting North Dakota v. United States,
495 U.S. 423, 432 (1990) (plurality opinion)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
19 See, e.g., Jonathan M. Rotter & Joshua S. Stambaugh, What’s Left of the Twenty-First
Amendment?, 6 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL‘Y & ETHICS J. 601, 649 (2008) (―While the three-tier
system is universally considered ‗unquestionably legitimate‘ to this day, that status may be
vulnerable in light of the courts‘ increasing reluctance to leave state liquor regulatory systems
untouched.‖); Tanford, supra note 11, at 330 (listing the unconstitutional effects of the three-tier
system and concluding that ―Granholm suggests that its days may be numbered‖).
20 Cagann, supra note 5, at 70.
21 ―Between 2004 and 2006, contributions to state-level political campaigns from beer,
wine, and spirits concerns totaled $21,362,727. The overwhelming majority of this money
comes from distributors and wholesalers of alcohol. . . . Wholesalers and distributors have more
to protect in terms of wealth . . . than any other industry, including producers.‖ Tom Wark, State
of the States: Money, Wine & Politics, FERMENTATION: THE DAILY WINE BLOG (Mar. 31,
2006), http://fermentation.typepad.com/fermentation/2006/03/state_of_the_st.html, cited in
Rotter & Stambaugh, supra note 19, at 645–46.
22 544 U.S. 460 (2005).
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regulate alcohol, could ―save‖ a law like Michigan‘s that would
otherwise be a clear violation of the dormant Commerce Clause‘s
nondiscrimination principle. The Granholm Court made it clear that
―straightforward attempts to discriminate in favor of local
producers . . . [are] contrary to the Commerce Clause and [are] not
saved by the Twenty-first Amendment.‖23
In response to Granholm, at least nine states with similarly
discriminatory laws on the books chose to extend direct-shipping
privileges to out-of-state wineries; no state revoked existing directshipping privileges completely.24 To that extent, the direct-shipping
advocates‘ plan seems to have worked. But other states have tried to
sidestep Granholm by passing ―interesting legislative devices‖25 that
apparently are meant to favor local wineries without
―straightforwardly‖ discriminating against out-of-state wineries. At
first glance, these devices, which allow limited direct shipping, do not
appear to discriminate because they are nominally available to all
wineries. But their opponents argue that the devices contain such
severe restrictions that in-state wineries are effectively the only
beneficiaries. Examples of such devices include: production limits,
case limits, face-to-face purchase requirements, prohibitive permit
costs, and reciprocity requirements.26 Of these various restrictions, the
production limit and the face-to-face purchase requirement are the
most significant.27 In general, a face-to-face purchase requirement
limits direct shipping by requiring consumers to make their purchases
in person at the winery. A production limit restricts direct shipping by
allowing only those wineries producing less than a specified amount
of wine per year to ship directly to consumers.
These types of laws tend to burden out-of-state wineries more than
in-state wineries,28 but because the language of the law applies
equally to in-state and out-of-state wineries, they do not fall neatly
into the Granholm rubric. Nevertheless, direct-shipping advocates
have brought a number of challenges to such laws in the wake of
Granholm; they have been met with mixed success.29 This Note posits
Id. at 489.
Maureen K. Ohlhausen & Gregory P. Luib, Moving Sideways: Post-Granholm
Developments in Wine Direct Shipping and Their Implications for Competition, 75 ANTITRUST
L.J. 505, 512–13 (2008).
25 Cary S. Wiggins, Wine Online: A Sampling of What’s Happening with Online Wine
Buying and Shipping, E-COMMERCE L. & STRATEGY, Sept. 2008, at 1, 9, available at
http://www.technologybar.org/2009/02/wine-online/#fn-294-1.
26 Id. at 9–10.
27 Ohlhausen & Luib, supra note 24, at 514.
28 Id. at 506.
29 Compare Family Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins, 592 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding
that Massachusetts‘s production limit violated the dormant Commerce Clause), Cherry Hill
23
24
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that this mixed success is the result of courts not applying the
dormant Commerce Clause consistently. This Note further argues that
the courts have been inconsistent not only because the proper
application of the dormant Commerce Clause is unclear, but also
because the dormant Commerce Clause is particularly difficult to
apply to laws regulating the wine industry. The wine industry poses
special problems not only because it implicates the Twenty-First
Amendment, but also because it is bifurcated and geographically
unbalanced.30
Part I of this Note briefly summarizes the history of federal alcohol
regulation in the United States through Granholm v. Heald. Part II
lays out in general terms the various dormant Commerce Clause tests
that courts use to analyze limited direct-shipping laws. Part III
discusses how different courts have applied these tests to face-to-face
Vineyards, LLC v. Lilly, 553 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that Kentucky‘s in-person
purchase requirement violated the Commerce Clause), Siesta Vill. Mkt., LLC v. Granholm, 596
F. Supp. 2d 1035 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (holding that Michigan‘s requirement that out-of-state
retailers maintain an in-state location in order to ship directly to consumers violated the dormant
Commerce Clause), Freeman v. Fischer, 563 F. Supp. 2d 493 (D.N.J. 2008) (holding that New
Jersey‘s provision allowing in-state wineries more salesrooms than out-of-state wineries
violated the dormant Commerce Clause), and S. Wine & Spirits of Tex., Inc. v. Steen, 486 F.
Supp. 2d 626 (W.D. Tex. 2007) (holding that the facially discriminatory residency requirements
imposed on out-of-state wine and liquor wholesalers was unconstitutional), with Black Star
Farms LLC v. Oliver, 600 F.3d 1225 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that Arizona‘s in-person purchase
requirement and production limit did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause), Baude v.
Heath, 538 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that the wholesale clause in Indiana‘s alcohol law,
which authorized some direct sales of wine, was unconstitutional, but that the face-to-face
clause was constitutional), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2382 (2009), Cherry Hill Vineyard, LLC v.
Baldacci, 505 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that Maine‘s in-person purchase requirement did
not violate the dormant Commerce Clause), Brooks v. Vassar, 462 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2006)
(holding that Virginia‘s personal import exception did not violate the dormant Commerce
Clause and that its policy of selling only in-state wines through its own stores was protected
under the ―market participant‖ exception to the dormant Commerce Clause), Beau v. Moore,
No. 4:05CV000903 SWW, 2007 WL 3231890 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 1, 2007) (dismissing on the
pleadings plaintiffs‘ claim that four different provisions of Arkansas‘s alcoholic beverage law
worked together to discriminate against out-of-state wineries in violation of the dormant
Commerce Clause), Longstreet Delicatessen, Fine Wines & Specialty Coffees, L.L.C. v. Jolly,
No. 1:06-CV-00986-OWW DLB, 2007 WL 2815022 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2007) (dismissing for
lack of standing a suit challenging the constitutionality of California‘s reciprocity law and
chartered flight provision), and Hurley v. Minner, No. CIV 05-826-SLR, 2006 WL 2789164 (D.
Del. Sept. 26, 2006) (dismissing for failure to state a claim a suit challenging the
constitutionality of Delaware‘s in-person purchase requirement).
30 The industry is bifurcated because there are now, ―broadly speaking, two categories of
wine[:] high-volume, lower-cost wines and low-volume, higher-quality, higher-priced boutique
wines.‖ Family Winemakers of Cal., 592 F.3d at 6. The fact that the top eleven percent of U.S.
wineries produce ninety-eight percent of U.S. wine illustrates the magnitude of this divide.
Family Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins, No. 06-11682-RWZ, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112074, at
*23 (D. Mass. Nov. 19, 2008), aff’d, 592 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010). It is also geographically
unbalanced, because California accounts for over ninety percent of U.S. wine production.
DONALD A. HODGEN, U.S. DEP‘T OF COMMERCE, U.S. WINE INDUSTRY—2008, at 5 (2009),
available at http://www.trade.gov/td/ocg/winereport_2009.pdf.
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purchase requirements and suggests which of their approaches courts
should adopt going forward. Part IV discusses how application of the
tests has diverged in the context of production limits. The Digestif
posits that the nonfungibility of wine might be used to bolster the
argument that these post-Granholm cases portend: the three-tier
system itself is unconstitutional.
I. THE ROAD TO GRANHOLM
A. Pre-Prohibition
The Commerce Clause provides that ―Congress shall have
Power . . . To regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.‖31
These words reflect
a central concern of the Framers that was an immediate
reason for calling the Constitutional Convention: the
conviction that in order to succeed, the new Union would
have to avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization
that had plagued relations among the Colonies and later
among the States under the Articles of Confederation. The
Commerce Clause has accordingly been interpreted by this
Court not only as an authorization for congressional action,
but also, even in the absence of a conflicting federal statute,
as a restriction on permissible state regulation.32
This implicit principle that the states may not interfere with interstate
commerce is known as the ―negative,‖ or ―dormant,‖ Commerce
Clause.33
As the temperance movement gained strength during the
nineteenth century, the dormant Commerce Clause became
problematic for states wishing to go dry. If a state banned alcohol,
residents could simply order some from a wet state.34 If the state then
tried to ban the importation of alcohol, the Court would strike the law
down under the dormant Commerce Clause.35 Essentially, it was
U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325–26 (1978) (citation omitted) (citing H.P. Hood
& Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949)).
33 See, e.g., Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep‘t of Natural Res., 504 U.S.
353, 359 (1992) (―As we have long recognized, the ‗negative‘ or ‗dormant‘ aspect of the
Commerce Clause prohibits States from ‗advanc[ing] their own commercial interests by
curtailing the movement of articles of commerce, either into or out of the state.‖ (alteration in
original) (quoting H.P. Hood & Sons, 336 U.S. at 535)).
34 Tanford, supra note 11, at 285.
35 See, e.g., Bowman v. Chi. & Nw. Ry., 125 U.S. 465 (1888) (holding that states did not
have the power to restrict or prohibit the importation of alcohol without the explicit or implicit
31
32
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impossible for a state to enforce its dry laws. Congress responded by
enacting the Wilson Act36 in 1890, which allowed a state to regulate
imported alcohol in the same way as its local alcohol.37 The Supreme
Court, however, construed the Act narrowly, holding that it applied
only to the resale of imported alcohol, not to the direct shipment of
alcohol to the ultimate consumer.38 Therefore, a consumer could still
circumvent his state‘s dry laws by having alcohol shipped directly to
him from a wet state. To close this loophole, Congress enacted the
Webb-Kenyon Act39 in 1913, allowing dry states to prevent their
residents from evading local prohibition.40 The narrow scope of the
Act is evident from its title, ―An Act divesting intoxicating liquors of
their interstate character in certain cases.‖41 It is clear from the debate
surrounding the passage of the Act, and the few Supreme Court cases
interpreting it before national Prohibition began, that it was intended
only to give effect to prohibition laws in dry states, not to allow for
disparate treatment of local and imported alcohol in wet states.42
B. The Eighteenth and Twenty-First Amendments
National Prohibition began in January 1920, one year after thirtysix states ratified the Eighteenth Amendment.43 When it came time to
end the failed ―Noble Experiment,‖44 Congress drafted the TwentyFirst Amendment, which the states ratified in 1933. Section 1 of the
Amendment repealed national Prohibition. Section 2 then added that

consent of Congress); see also Tanford, supra note 11, at 285 (describing same).
36 Ch. 728, 26 Stat. 313 (1890) (current version at 27 U.S.C. § 121 (2006)).
37 Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 478 (2005).
38 See, e.g., Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412, 423 (1898) (holding that the words ―upon
arrival‖ in the Wilson Act meant that a state could not regulate imported alcohol until after
delivery had been completed); see also Tanford, supra note 11, at 285–87 (discussing the
Court‘s interpretation of the Wilson Act).
39 Ch. 90, § 1, 37 Stat. 699 (1913) (current version at 27 U.S.C. § 122 (2006)).
40 See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 481–82 (discussing how the Supreme Court previously
interpreted the Webb-Kenyon Act to extend the Wilson Act‘s authority to interstate shipments
and close the direct-shipment gap).
41 Tanford, supra note 11, at 288.
42 See, e.g., Clark Distilling Co. v. W. Md. Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311, 323–24 (1917)
(stating that the sole purpose of the Webb-Kenyon Act was to give effect to dry laws in states
that had prohibition); see also Tanford, supra note 11, at 287–89 (quoting statements made by
several senators and representatives during debates in Congress and explaining the Supreme
Court cases that held that the Act did not authorize discrimination against imported alcohol).
43 See BORIS I. BITTKER WITH THE COLLABORATION OF BRANNON P. DENNING, BITTKER
ON THE REGULATION OF INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE § 13.01, at 13-3 (1999).
44 A term generally, though perhaps erroneously, attributed to Herbert Hoover. PAUL F.
BOLLER, JR. & JOHN GEORGE, THEY NEVER SAID IT: A BOOK OF FAKE QUOTES, MISQUOTES,
AND MISLEADING ATTRIBUTIONS 47–48 (1989); see, e.g., Tanford, supra note 11, at 289 n.103
(attributing quotation to Herbert Hoover).
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―[t]he transportation or importation into any State . . . for delivery or
use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is
hereby prohibited.‖45 This language is very similar to the WebbKenyon Act, which provides:
The shipment or transportation, in any manner or by any
means whatsoever, of any . . . intoxicating liquor of any kind,
from one State . . . into any other State, . . . which
said . . . intoxicating liquor is intended, by any person
interested therein, to be received, possessed, sold, or in any
manner used, either in the original package or otherwise, in
violation of any law of such State . . . is hereby prohibited.46
The purpose of Section 2 is arguably the same as that of the WebbKenyon Act—that is, to empower states to enforce their dry laws if
they wish to continue local prohibition.47 Some evidence for this
interpretation can be found in the statements of Senator Blaine, the
Senate sponsor of the Amendment, who said during debate, ―So, to
assure the so-called dry States against the importation of intoxicating
liquor into those States, it is proposed to write permanently into the
Constitution a prohibition along that line.‖48 But other evidence
suggests that Section 2 was meant to grant states much broader power
to regulate alcohol.49 In fact, Senator Blaine himself later said, ―The
purpose of section 2 is to restore to the States by constitutional
amendment absolute control in effect over interstate commerce
affecting intoxicating liquors which enter the confines of the
States.‖50

U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
27 U.S.C. § 122 (2006); see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 205–06 (1976) (―The
wording of § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment closely follows the Webb-Kenyon and Wilson
Acts . . . .‖ (footnote omitted)).
47 Tanford, supra note 11, at 291–95.
48 76 CONG. REC. 4141 (1933); see also Rotter & Stambaugh, supra note 19, at 608–09
(discussing Blaine‘s statements). Part of the motivation for writing the Webb-Kenyon Act into
the Constitution may have been that the constitutionality of the Act was somewhat in doubt. See
Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 481 (2005) (―The constitutionality of the Webb-Kenyon Act
was in doubt.‖); see also Tanford, supra note 11, at 291 & n.108 (stating that the purpose of the
Twenty-First Amendment was to write the Webb-Kenyon Act into the Constitution so that it
could not be repealed by Congress). The Act was passed over President Taft‘s veto, WebbKenyon Act, ch. 90, § 1, 37 Stat. 699 (1913), and upheld by a divided Court in Clark Distilling
Co. v. Western Maryland Railway Co., 242 U.S. 311 (1917).
49 See Rotter & Stambaugh, supra note 19, at 609–11 (discussing the argument that the
text of the amendment and the Court‘s initial interpretation of it are evidence that a broad
interpretation is correct).
50 76 CONG. REC. 4143 (1933); see also Rotter & Stambaugh, supra note 19, at 609
(discussing Senator Blaine‘s comments).
45
46
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Given this murky legislative history, it is not surprising that the
Amendment is open to a number of conflicting interpretations, which
in turn have generated a large body of Supreme Court decisions. The
Court‘s Twenty-First Amendment jurisprudence has evolved
significantly over the past seventy-seven years; many decisions in this
area reflect the fundamental disagreement about the intent of the
Amendment‘s framers.51
C. The Court’s Shifting Twenty-First Amendment Jurisprudence
Initially, the Court interpreted the Amendment broadly, as
evidenced by its first major case on the subject, State Board of
Equalization v. Young’s Market Co.52 The Court focused on the text
of the Amendment rather than its legislative history,53 and Justice
Brandeis famously announced:
The words used [in Section 2 of the Amendment] are apt to
confer upon the State the power to forbid all importations
which do not comply with the conditions which it prescribes.
The plaintiffs ask us to limit this broad command. They
request us to construe the Amendment as saying, in effect:
The State may prohibit the importation of intoxicating liquors
provided it prohibits the manufacture and sale within its
borders; but if it permits such manufacture and sale, it must
let imported liquors compete with the domestic on equal
terms. To say that, would involve not a construction of the
Amendment, but a rewriting of it.54
The Court‘s early Twenty-First Amendment cases, which followed in
Young’s Market‘s footsteps, ―gave the Amendment such a broad
reading that it looked like states could regulate, restrict, and burden
interstate sales and deliveries of liquor in any way they wanted,
‗unfettered by the Commerce Clause.‘‖55 States used the broad
authority granted to them in the Court‘s early cases to enact laws that
favored in-state producers and discriminated against out-of-state
producers and importers.56

BITTKER, supra note 43, § 13.02, at 13-5 to -6.
299 U.S. 59 (1936).
53 Tanford, supra note 11, at 296.
54 Young’s Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. at 62; see also BITTKER, supra note 43, § 13.03, at 13-7.
55 Tanford, supra note 11, at 296–97 (footnote omitted) (quoting Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves,
308 U.S. 132, 138–39 (1939)).
56 BITTKER, supra note 43, § 13.04, at 13-14.
51
52
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In time the Court began to retreat from its initial position and
instead attempted to balance the Twenty-First Amendment against the
dormant Commerce Clause.57 For example, in Hostetter v. Idlewild
Bon Voyage Liquor Corp.,58 the Court recognized that earlier cases
such as Young’s Market had established broad state power over
alcohol, but it qualified that power by reasoning that ―[t]o draw a
conclusion from this line of decisions that the Twenty-first
Amendment has somehow operated to ‗repeal‘ the Commerce Clause
wherever regulation of intoxicating liquors is concerned would . . . be
an absurd oversimplification.‖59
A major shift in the Court‘s jurisprudence came in the 1980s. In
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias,60 the Court finally took the opportunity
to address the issue of discrimination, which it had left open in
Young’s Market.61 In Bacchus, the Court struck down a Hawaiian law
that exempted two local alcoholic beverages from the State‘s twentypercent excise tax on wholesale sales of liquor. The Court concluded
that despite its doubts about the scope of, and intent behind, the
Amendment,
one thing is certain: The central purpose of [Section 2] was
not to empower States to favor local liquor industries by
erecting barriers to competition. It is also beyond doubt that
the Commerce Clause itself furthers strong federal interests in
preventing economic Balkanization. State laws that constitute
mere economic protectionism are therefore not entitled to the
same deference as laws enacted to combat the perceived evils
of an unrestricted traffic in liquor. Here, the State does not
seek to justify its tax on the ground that it was designed to
promote temperance or to carry out any other purpose of the
Twenty-first Amendment, but instead acknowledges that the
purpose was ―to promote a local industry.‖ Consequently,
because the tax violates a central tenet of the Commerce
Clause but is not supported by any clear concern of the
Twenty-first Amendment, we reject the State‘s belated claim
based on the Amendment.62

57 Id. at 13-14 to -15. The Court also began balancing the Amendment against other
federal and constitutional principles such as the federal antitrust laws and the individual rights
found in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 13-14.
58 377 U.S. 324 (1964).
59 Id. at 331–32; see also Tanford, supra note 11, at 298 (discussing Idlewild).
60 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
61 Tanford, supra note 11, at 298–99.
62 Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 276 (citations omitted); see also BITTKER, supra note 43, § 13.04,
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The Bacchus Court essentially adopted a balancing test to
determine ―whether the principles underlying the Twenty-first
Amendment are sufficiently implicated by [the challenged law] to
outweigh the Commerce Clause principles that would otherwise be
offended.‖63 The Court pointed to its decision in Capital Cities Cable,
Inc. v. Crisp64 for an alternative formulation of the test: ―whether the
interests implicated by a state regulation are so closely related to the
powers reserved by the Twenty-first Amendment that the regulation
may prevail, notwithstanding that its requirements directly conflict
with express federal policies.‖65 This balancing test was dubbed the
―core concerns‖ test.66 Given the ambiguity surrounding the original
meaning of and intent behind the Twenty-First Amendment,
identifying its core concerns was a somewhat dubious task. The
Bacchus Court confirmed only that ―mere economic protectionism‖ is
not one of them.67 But it was eventually settled that ―promoting
temperance, ensuring orderly market conditions, and raising revenue‖
were the Twenty-First Amendment‘s core concerns.68
Milton S. Kronheim & Co. v. District of Columbia69 provides an
example of how asserting a core concern can tip the balance in the
state‘s favor, even ―in what would otherwise be a clear case of
economic protectionism.‖70 In Kronheim, the District of Columbia
had enacted a law that required alcoholic beverage licensees to store
their entire inventory in the District. The District of Columbia Circuit
found that even if the law were protectionist (and it acknowledged
that Kronheim had made a credible argument that it was), the law was
also motivated by the core concerns of the Twenty-First Amendment.
By requiring alcoholic beverages to be stored in the District, the law
facilitated the monitoring of licensees‘ compliance with other alcohol
beverage control laws and with tax laws. The fact that the law had
mixed motives distinguished it from Bacchus; the Bacchus Court had
at 13-19 to -20 (discussing Bacchus).
63 Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 275; see also Gregory E. Durkin, Note, What Does Granholm v.
Heald Mean for the Future of the Twenty-First Amendment, the Three-Tier System, and Efficient
Alcohol Distribution?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1095, 1104 (2006) (discussing the same
Bacchus language).
64 467 U.S. 691 (1984).
65 Id. at 714; see also Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 275–76 (quoting the Capital Cities test).
66 See, e.g., Dickerson v. Bailey, 336 F.3d 388, 404 (5th Cir. 2003) (stating that the
Bacchus test is ―commonly referred to as the ‗core concerns‘ test‖); see also Durkin, supra note
63, at 1104 & n.42.
67 Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 276.
68 North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1990) (plurality opinion); see also
Durkin, supra note 63, at 1104 & n.44.
69 91 F.3d 193 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
70 BITTKER, supra note 43, § 13.04, at 13-21.

12/30/2010 9:21:44 PM

2010]

THE LEGACY OF GRANHOLM V. HEALD

321

found that the Hawaiian excise tax violated the Commerce Clause and
was not supported by any core Twenty-First Amendment concern.71
Accordingly, the Kronheim court concluded, ―[A]lthough the Act
facially violates the negative commerce clause, it is supported by a
clear concern for the core enforcement function of the Twenty-first
Amendment‖ and is therefore constitutional.72 In other words,
applying the core-concerns test gives a court the opportunity to
―save‖ a discriminatory alcohol regulation by allowing the TwentyFirst Amendment to outweigh the dormant Commerce Clause.
D. The First Shoe Drops
But about a decade later, the balance shifted in favor of the
dormant Commerce Clause when the Court announced its opinion in
Granholm v. Heald. The consolidated cases in Granholm dealt with
direct-shipping laws in Michigan and New York. Michigan allowed
in-state wineries to ship wine directly to in-state customers; out-ofstate wineries were not allowed to apply for this type of license. New
York allowed wineries that produce wine only from New York grapes
to ship directly to in-state customers; other wineries (i.e., out-of-state
wineries) could do so only if they first established a presence (a
factory, office, or storeroom) in New York.73 In both cases, the
plaintiffs were in-state consumers and out-of-state ―small wineries
that rely on direct consumer sales as an important part of their
businesses.‖74
Before beginning its analysis of the challenged exceptions to the
three-tier system, the Court reaffirmed that ―the three-tier system
itself is ‗unquestionably legitimate.‘‖75 The Court, however, offered
no explanation of why the system is still legitimate. Perhaps it
believed that its choice of adverb obviated any need to so do. The
Court did, however, explain why these particular exceptions were not
legitimate. Interestingly, the Court characterized Michigan and New
York‘s alcohol regulatory schemes not as general three-tier systems
with exceptions for in-state wineries, but as limited three-tier systems
that applied only to out-of-state wineries.76 Either way one looks at it,
the Court‘s conclusion is accurate: ―The differential treatment

Kronheim, 91 F.3d at 203–04; see also BITTKER, supra note 43, § 13.04, at 13-21.
Kronheim, 91 F.3d at 204.
73 Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 469–70 (2005).
74 Id. at 468.
75 Id. at 489 (quoting North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1990) (plurality
opinion)).
76 Id. at 465–67.
71
72
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between in-state and out-of-state wineries constitutes explicit
discrimination against interstate commerce.‖77
The Court was able to reach this conclusion by holding that ―the
Twenty-first Amendment does not supersede other provisions of the
Constitution and, in particular, does not displace the rule that States
may not give a discriminatory preference to their own producers.‖78
With regard to direct shipping in particular, the Court held, ―If a State
chooses to allow direct shipment of wine, it must do so on
evenhanded terms‖ because the Twenty-First Amendment ―does not
allow States to ban, or severely limit, the direct shipment of out-ofstate wine while simultaneously authorizing direct shipment by instate producers.‖79 The Court concluded that both States‘ laws, ―by
their own terms,‖ violated the Commerce Clause‘s proscription
against discriminating against interstate commerce.80
In his dissent, Justice Thomas noted that this holding is strange
because although ―[t]he Court place[d] much weight upon the
authority of Bacchus . . . [it did] not even mention, let alone apply, the
‗core concerns‘ test that Bacchus established. The Court instead sub
silentio cast[] aside that test, employing otherwise-applicable negative
Commerce Clause scrutiny and giving no weight to the Twenty-first
Amendment.‖81 Therefore, by clarifying that the Twenty-First
Amendment cannot save a discriminatory state law, Granholm
created a new question: whether the core-concerns test has any
remaining validity. Moreover, the Granholm Court did not clarify
how lower courts should determine discrimination in less clear-cut
cases. This dual uncertainty makes it difficult to analyze the
―interesting legislative devices‖ that have been enacted since
Granholm. These new limitations on direct shipping do burden
interstate commerce, but they do not discriminate ―by their own
terms,‖ like the laws at issue in Granholm. It is also unclear how
much weight to give the States‘ arguments that these limitations
promote core Twenty-First Amendment concerns.82

Id. at 467.
Id. at 486.
79 Id. at 493.
80 Id. at 476.
81 Id. at 524 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
82 For example, States have argued that face-to-face purchase requirements help limit
minors‘ access to alcohol. See, e.g., Baude v. Heath, 538 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. denied,
129 S. Ct. 2382 (2009).
77
78
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II. DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE ANALYSIS
When analyzing a law that has been challenged under the dormant
Commerce Clause, a court must first choose which level of scrutiny
to apply. Laws that discriminate against interstate commerce are
subject to heightened scrutiny. Laws that burden interstate commerce,
but do not rise to the level of being discriminatory, are analyzed under
the balancing test established in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.83 This
threshold question of discrimination is often outcome determinative
because the heightened-scrutiny test contains a strong presumption of
invalidity, whereas the Pike balancing test is much more lenient.84
The plaintiff has the burden of establishing that the law
discriminates against interstate commerce. ―‗[D]iscrimination‘ simply
means differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic
interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter.‖85 There are
potentially three ways to prove discrimination. First, a law may be
facially discriminatory. If the language of the statute itself
distinguishes between in-state and out-of-state entities, then the law is
discriminatory on its face.86 Second, a law may be discriminatory in
effect. Even if the statute appears to treat all entities the same way,
i.e., it is facially neutral, it may in reality still discriminate in favor of
in-state entities.87 Third, a law may be discriminatory in purpose. The
test for determining whether the legislature passed the law for a
discriminatory purpose is not entirely clear; it is also unclear whether
a finding of discriminatory purpose, on its own, is sufficient to trigger
heightened scrutiny.88 In any case, once the plaintiff establishes that
the law is discriminatory, the burden shifts to the State to prove that
the law ―advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be
adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.‖89
397 U.S. 137 (1970).
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 430–31 (3d
ed. 2006); Ohlhausen & Luib, supra note 24, at 524–28.
85 Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep‘t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994).
86 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 84, at 431. For example, the Michigan law at issue in
Granholm was facially discriminatory because it provided that in-state wineries could ship
directly but that out-of-state wineries could not. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 476 (2005).
87 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 84, at 433. The criteria for determining discriminatory effect
are not exactly clear and will be discussed in more detail in Parts III and IV.
88 See infra Part IV.A.1.
89 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 463 (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269,
278 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Granholm Court did not actually use the
words ―heightened scrutiny‖ but several circuit cases do describe this test as the heightenedscrutiny test. See, e.g., Wine & Spirits Retailers, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 481 F.3d 1, 10–11 (1st
Cir. 2007). Unfortunately, the Supreme Court once referred to this test as ―strict scrutiny.‖ See
Or. Waste Sys., Inc., 511 U.S. at 94. This has caused some confusion among lower courts. See,
e.g., infra note 119 and accompanying text.
83
84
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This opportunity to defend the law is all but illusory because
discriminatory laws ―face ‗a virtually per se rule of invalidity.‘‖90
If the law is not discriminatory, then the plaintiff must prove that
the law‘s burdens clearly outweigh its benefits in order for the court
to declare it unconstitutional. Or, as the Pike Court put it, ―Where the
statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public
interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it
will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.‖91
Two interesting features of this formulation make the Pike test
difficult to apply. First, the test requires the court to balance the
burdens on all of interstate commerce against the benefits to a single
state. The two sides of the balance seem to be measuring very
different things; consequently, there are no set standards for how the
court should make this comparison.92 The only guidance provided by
the Pike Court is, ―[T]he extent of the burden that will be tolerated
will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and
on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on
interstate activities.‖93 Second, although the State must show a
significant local benefit in order to win the balancing test, if the
benefit is too great, it might appear that the State passed the law for a
discriminatory purpose. This makes the Pike test a bit paradoxical.94
Moreover, because Granholm left the core-concerns test up in the air,
there is a possibility that the Twenty-First Amendment is still relevant
to Pike analysis. Granholm held that the Twenty-First Amendment
cannot save a discriminatory law; it did not explain how the TwentyFirst Amendment affects a nondiscriminatory alcohol regulation that
is at risk of failing the Pike test.95
III. FACE-TO-FACE PURCHASE REQUIREMENTS
The courts that have addressed the constitutionality of face-to-face
purchase requirements have treated them quite differently. Sections A
through C discuss three recent cases in this area: Baude v. Heath,96
Cherry Hill Vineyards, LLC v. Lilly,97 and Cherry Hill Vineyard, LLC
90 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 476 (quoting City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617,
624 (1978)).
91 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
92 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 84, at 437.
93 Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
94 See BITTKER, supra note 43, § 6.06, at 6-34.
95 See Durkin, supra note 63, at 1108–10.
96 538 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2382 (2009).
97 553 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 2008).
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v. Baldacci.98 Section D proposes a mode of analysis for future faceto-face requirement challenges. The main question appears to be
where to draw the line between an incidental burden and a
discriminatory effect. And within that issue lies a secondary question
of how to deal with the difference between state borders and
geographic distance. Interestingly, two of these courts also considered
the nonfungibility of wine, but came to different conclusions about its
implications; Section D addresses this issue as well.
A. Baude v. Heath
In Baude v. Heath, the plaintiffs challenged certain restrictions on
the direct-shipping exception to Indiana‘s three-tier system. One of
the challenged restrictions was the face-to-face purchase requirement,
which ―requires any consumer who wants to receive direct shipments
of wine—from any winery, in or out of Indiana—to visit the winery
once and supply proof of name, age, address, and phone number, plus
a verified statement that the wine is intended for personal
consumption.‖99 The parties sparred over which standard should
govern the court‘s analysis—heightened scrutiny or the Pike
balancing test.100 The district court noted, ―[T]here is ‗no clear line
separating the category of state regulation that is virtually per se
invalid under the Commerce Clause, and the category subject to the
Pike v. Bruce Church balancing approach.‘‖101 The Seventh Circuit
has characterized the difference between a law that is discriminatory
in effect and a law that burdens interstate commerce incidentally as a
difference of degree.102
The district court in Baude concluded that the face-to-face
requirement was discriminatory in effect. It reasoned that the degree
of the burden imposed depends on how far the winery is from Indiana
and that, ―as the parties know, the overwhelming number of out-ofstate [wineries] are not located close to Indiana‘s borders. They are
hundreds of miles away. . . . [Therefore, i]n practical effect, the
statute discriminates far more heavily against out-of-state
wineries.‖103 The district court further held that although Indiana had
505 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 2007).
Baude, 538 F.3d at 612.
100 Baude v. Heath, No. 1:05-cv-0735-JDT-TAB, 2007 WL 2479587, at *12–13 (S.D. Ind.
Aug. 29, 2007), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 538 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129
S. Ct. 2382 (2009).
101 Id. at *13 (quoting Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S.
573, 579 (1986)).
102 Id. (citing Nat‘l Paint & Coatings Ass‘n v. City of Chicago, 45 F.3d 1124, 1131 (7th
Cir. 1995)).
103 Id. at *22.
98
99
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a legitimate interest in curbing underage drinking, it failed to prove
that there were no less discriminatory means available.104 The
plaintiffs had offered two alternatives: requiring the common carrier
to verify the recipient‘s age upon delivery, or requiring wineries to
use a third-party age verification service.105
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit decided that the Pike test was the
proper standard to apply. Chief Judge Easterbrook wrote that the rule
of per se invalidity applies to laws that are discriminatory on their
face, and that the provisions challenged in this case were not facially
discriminatory. He did not, however, explicitly say that laws that are
discriminatory in effect do not merit heightened scrutiny. Instead, he
rephrased the district court‘s finding to eliminate the word
discrimination, thus making it appear that the Pike balancing test was
the appropriate test. Specifically, he said that the district court had
concluded that the challenged laws ―impose higher costs on interstate
commerce.‖106
Forced to use the Pike framework, the plaintiffs-appellees argued
that the burdens of the face-to-face requirement outweigh its benefits.
The law burdens interstate commerce because the farther away the
winery is, the more expensive it becomes for the customer to make
the visit; the law‘s benefit (curbing underage consumers‘ access to
wine) is minimal because underage people can find a way to obtain
wine no matter what the law provides.107
Without addressing the district court‘s observation that the vast
majority of out-of-state wineries are located on the West Coast, the
Seventh Circuit emphasized that many Indianans live closer to
Michigan or Illinois wineries than to in-state wineries. Chief Judge
Easterbrook also hypothesized that an oenophile could take one
vacation to Napa and sign up for direct shipping at a multitude of
wineries, making the cost per winery quite small. Because not as
many people vacation in Indiana wine country, and because Indiana‘s
wineries are much more spread out than Napa‘s, it could actually be
more costly for a non-Indianan oenophile to sign up at an equivalent
number of Indiana wineries. He concluded,

104 The test is actually whether any ―reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives‖ exist.
Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 489 (2005) (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486
U.S. 269, 278 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court may have gotten
this confused with the Pike inquiry, which is whether the purpose could be accomplished with a
―lesser impact‖ on interstate commerce. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
105 Baude, 2007 WL 2479587, at *24.
106 Baude v. Heath, 538 F.3d 608, 611 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2382
(2009).
107 Id. at 612–14.
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[A]lthough it may be more costly for a person living in
Indianapolis to satisfy the face-to-face requirement at five
Oregon wineries than at five Indiana wineries, it is not
necessarily substantially more expensive (per winery) to sign
up at a larger number of west-coast wineries than at an
equivalent number of Indiana wine producers.108
As for the law‘s minimal benefits, the plaintiffs argued that the
two alternative age-verification methods they had proposed in the
district court were just as effective as a face-to-face verification. They
also argued that studies have shown that face-to-face age verification
is actually ineffective. The court gave little weight to these arguments
and their supporting evidence. It also reasoned that the fact that
underage people will try to get around the law does not imply that
there is no point in having the law in the first place. ―The face-to-face
requirement makes it harder for minors to get wine. Anything that
raises the cost of an activity will diminish the quantity—not to zero,
but no law is or need be fully effective.‖109
Baude illustrates why the level of scrutiny applied is so important.
By finding that the law was not discriminatory, the Seventh Circuit
forced the plaintiffs to argue that the cost of visiting a winery clearly
outweighs the benefit of restricting minors‘ access to alcohol; it also
saved the State from having to argue that the less costly ageverification alternatives are unreasonable.
B. Cherry Hill Vineyards, LLC v. Lilly
Kentucky‘s face-to-face purchase requirement, at issue in Cherry
Hill Vineyards, LLC v. Lilly, differed from Indiana‘s requirement in
that it required the customer to make each purchase in person, not just
the initial purchase.110 The plaintiffs argued that the law was
discriminatory in effect. Out-of-state wineries are burdened because
the law drives up the cost of their wines; they must either incur extra
costs by selling through a Kentucky wholesaler or wait for Kentucky
customers to travel thousands of miles to their wineries to make
purchases. And wineries that cannot secure wholesaler representation
are completely shut out of the Kentucky market unless the Kentucky
customers come to them. Even if a winery has an established
relationship with a customer and has verified his age and address, the
customer must still come to the winery each time he wants to place an
108 Id.

at 613.
at 614.
110 Cherry Hill Vineyards, LLC v. Lilly, 553 F.3d 423, 427–28, 433 (6th Cir. 2008).
109 Id.
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order.111 Both Kentucky wineries and Kentucky wholesalers benefit
from the law. Small Kentucky wineries benefit from less competition
from out-of-state wineries, especially wineries that are very far away
and whose wines are preferred by consumers. Wholesalers benefit
because the law limits the extent to which wineries can bypass the
wholesale tier; ―the statute guarantees the Wholesalers a source of
revenue that would not exist but for the statute.‖112
In the district court, Kentucky had argued that the requirement‘s
effect on interstate commerce was incidental because Kentucky has
seven border states and some Kentuckians are closer to those out-ofstate wineries than to Kentucky wineries.113 The plaintiffs made three
counterpoints. First, they argued that the State‘s observation ignored
the fact that there are wineries outside of Kentucky and its border
states. Second, wine is a unique product. Third, many of the desirable
wines come from the West Coast, not from Kentucky‘s border
states.114 The district court agreed with the plaintiffs that the State was
not looking at ―interstate economic interests as a whole.‖115 Kentucky
and its border states account for only 0.6% of the nation‘s total wine
production.116 The court said,
We note that wine is a unique product. Accordingly, we agree
with the plaintiffs that ―it is false to presume that a wine
consumer would purchase from the closest winery all things
being equal.‖ Thus, the defendants‘ argument is flawed. We
are convinced that the effect on interstate commerce is not de
minimis.117
After the court found that the requirement was discriminatory in
effect, the State argued that the requirement should still be upheld
because it furthered the legitimate purposes of promoting temperance,
curbing underage drinking, and maintaining tax revenue.118 But the
district court held that the requirement was not sufficiently narrowly
tailored to achieving those goals.119 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit
111 Id.

at 432–33.
at 433.
113 Cherry Hill Vineyards, LLC v. Hudgins, 488 F. Supp. 2d 601, 616 (W.D. Ky. 2006),
aff’d sub nom. Cherry Hill Vineyards, LLC v. Lilly, 553 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 2008). The named
state defendant changed when the case went up on appeal because the Kentucky Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control changed executive directors during that time period. Lilly, 553 F.3d
at 426 n.1.
114 Hudgins, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 616–17.
115 Id. at 616 (emphasis added).
116 Id. at 617.
117 Id. (citations omitted).
118 Id. at 618–22.
119 Id. at 622. Determining whether the law is narrowly tailored to achieve its purpose is
112 Id.
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affirmed the district court‘s findings that the requirement was
discriminatory in effect and unconstitutional.120
The district court‘s finding of discriminatory effect seems to rest
on its observation that most out-of-state wineries are located on the
West Coast, not in the states that border Kentucky. This means that it
is generally much more costly for a Kentuckian to visit an out-of-state
winery than an in-state winery. This added cost is a burden on
Kentucky wine consumers as well as on interstate commerce. These
same arguments also apply to Indiana‘s face-to-face requirement. The
reason Kentucky‘s requirement was struck down while Indiana‘s was
not is probably that the Kentucky requirement applied to every
purchase, not just the initial purchase. Over the long term, Kentucky‘s
requirement is much more burdensome than Indiana‘s.
C. Cherry Hill Vineyard, LLC v. Baldacci
In Cherry Hill Vineyard, LLC v. Baldacci, the plaintiffs challenged
an exception to Maine‘s three-tier system that allows small wineries
(―farm wineries‖ in the statute) to sell directly to consumers, provided
that it is a face-to-face sale at the winery, or at one of up to two offsite locations established by the winery.121 The plaintiffs argued that
the requirement is discriminatory in effect because it raises the cost of
West Coast wines as compared with Maine wines.122
The court noted that the Supreme Court has never explicitly said
what showing is required to prove discriminatory effect. The First
Circuit decided, ―[T]hat showing must be substantial.‖123
Consequently, it made short work of the plaintiffs‘ arguments.
[T]he plaintiffs have proffered no evidence that permitting
farm wineries to sell only face to face, either on premises or
at approved in-state locations, discriminates against interstate
commerce. There is no evidence that Maine law acts to
protect Maine vineyards or that Maine consumers substitute

not the proper test. The proper test is whether there are reasonable nondiscriminatory
alternatives that could achieve the same purpose. The district court did refer to the correct test,
but it mistakenly labeled the test as the ―strict scrutiny‖ test. See id. at 617–18. It may have
made this mistake because the Court once referred to this test as ―strict scrutiny.‖ See Or. Waste
Sys., Inc. v. Dep‘t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 94 (1994). The actual strict scrutiny test is
used in the Equal Protection setting; it requires that a law be narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling government interest. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist.
No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 714 (2007); see also supra note 89 and accompanying text.
120 Cherry Hill Vineyards, LLC v. Lilly, 553 F.3d 423, 426 (6th Cir. 2008).
121 Cherry Hill Vineyard, LLC v. Baldacci, 505 F.3d 28, 30–31 (1st Cir. 2007).
122 Id. at 31–34 & n.2.
123 Id. at 36.
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wine purchased directly from Maine vineyards for wines that
they otherwise would have purchased from out-of-state
producers. There is not even evidence that any wines at all
are purchased by consumers directly from Maine vineyards.
And, finally, nothing contained in the stipulated record
suggests that the locus option somehow alters the competitive
balance between in-state and out-of-state firms.
The substitution scenario is further weakened by the fact that
the plaintiffs have adduced no evidence that would in any
way undermine the plausible impression that Maine
consumers (like imbibers everywhere) view trips to a winery
as a distinct experience incommensurate with—and,
therefore, unlikely to be replaced by—a trip to either a
mailbox or a retail liquor store. Nor have they offered
evidence to impeach the suggestion, made in one of the cases
on which they rely, that bottles of wine are unique and, thus,
unlikely to be perceived by consumers as interchangeable.124
The plaintiffs responded by arguing ―that even if ‗the impact is
small because direct sales do not constitute a significant market
and . . . in-state wineries do not do much walk-in business,‘ the
regime is nonetheless unconstitutional because the dormant
commerce clause contains no de minimis exception.‖125 The plaintiffs
relied on Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison126 for
this proposition. In that case, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that under
the Commerce Clause, there is no de minimis defense to a finding of
discriminatory taxation.127 The First Circuit found that the case was
not on point because it dealt with a law that was discriminatory on its
face, as opposed to being discriminatory in effect.128 The First Circuit
reasoned,
[T]he plaintiffs cannot succeed in this case merely by
invoking the de minimis standard and ignoring their burden to
proffer substantial evidence of discrimination. . . . Were we to
require no showing beyond the de minimis level, no
124 Id. at 36–37 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (citing Hunt v. Wash. State Apple
Adver. Comm‘n, 432 U.S. 333, 351 (1977); Jelovsek v. Bresden, 482 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1021
(E.D. Tenn. 2007)).
125 Id. at 38 (omission in original) (quoting Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 8, 2007
U.S. 1st Cir. Briefs LEXIS 44, at *10).
126 520 U.S. 564 (1997).
127 Id. at 581 n.15.
128 Baldacci, 505 F.3d at 38.
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distinction would exist between the discriminatory effect test
and the incidental burden test . . . in Pike.129
The court decided that the plaintiffs‘ main complaint was about the
effects of geography, and concluded, ―An effect is not
discriminatory . . . if it results from natural conditions.‖130 The court
also reasoned, ―Given Maine‘s large land mass and the concentration
of its population in the southern end of the state, it cannot plausibly
be said that the farm winery exception redounds to the exclusive
benefit of Maine vineyards.‖131 After finding that the requirement is
not discriminatory in effect, the court did not analyze the requirement
under the Pike balancing test because the plaintiffs had made a ―rifleshot appeal,‖ arguing only discriminatory effect.132
The Baldacci court apparently chose to formalize the distinction
between an incidental burden and a discriminatory effect by imposing
a higher burden of proof—substantial showing—on plaintiffs who
argue discriminatory effect. The Baldacci court also declined to
recognize that the U.S. wine industry is geographically unbalanced—
that is, most out-of-state wineries are not located anywhere near the
southern end of Maine. But even if the court had recognized that the
face-to-face requirement raises the cost of West Coast wine in
comparison to Maine wine, this fact alone probably would not have
been sufficient. Instead, the First Circuit wanted evidence that Maine
wineries have actually benefitted from this law to the detriment of
out-of-state wineries—that Mainers have actually visited in-state
wineries to purchase wine and that such purchases replaced potential
purchases of out-of-state wine. The court gave two reasons why such
a result is unlikely. First, visiting a winery is recreational and will
therefore not replace a Mainer‘s regular alcohol purchasing habits.133
And second, because wines are unique, a Mainer will not replace an
out-of-state wine with a Maine wine just because it is cheaper to visit
the Maine winery.134
D. Proposed Analysis of Face-to-Face Purchase Requirements
First, courts should not place a higher burden of proof on plaintiffs
who argue discriminatory effect. The Baldacci court decided that the
129 Id.

at 38–39.
at 37 n.7.
131 Id. at 37–38 (citation omitted) (citing Grant‘s Dairy—Me., LLC v. Comm‘r of Me.
Dep‘t of Agric., Food & Rural Res., 232 F.3d 8, 21 (1st Cir. 2000)).
132 Id. at 33.
133 Id. at 37.
134 Id.
130 Id.
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plaintiffs‘ showing must be substantial, but that is illogical.135 Instead
of requiring a substantial showing of discriminatory effect, courts
should require a showing of a substantial burden on interstate
commerce. When phrased in this way, the requirement echoes the
Seventh Circuit‘s observation that the difference between an
incidental burden and a discriminatory effect is one of degree.
―Substantial burden‖ is simply the name for the point at which a law‘s
incidental effects on interstate commerce become discriminatory.
This proposed formulation is meant only to clarify the framework; it
should not actually affect a court‘s analysis. Deciding whether a law
is discriminatory in effect or places only incidental burdens on
interstate commerce remains a fact-sensitive balancing task. The
complement to this proposal is that a de minimis burden on interstate
commerce should not trigger a finding of discriminatory effect. A de
minimis burden is analogous to an incidental burden,136 which the
Court has established is not discriminatory.137
If a court does find that the burden on interstate commerce is
sufficient to establish that the law is discriminatory in effect, then the
court should apply heightened scrutiny. Baude implied that
heightened scrutiny is reserved for laws that are facially
discriminatory. The Seventh Circuit may have been relying on the
Supreme Court‘s statement, ―State laws discriminating against
interstate commerce on their face are ‗virtually per se invalid.‘‖138
But the Court has also said the rule of per se invalidity applies ―where
simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation.‖139
And in Bacchus the Court said, ―A finding that state legislation
constitutes ‗economic protectionism‘ may be made on the basis of

135 Although the Baldacci court did not explain why it decided to require a substantial
showing, Professor David Day offers one possible explanation: a finding of discriminatory
effect requires a higher degree of judicial intervention because the court must review empirical
evidence, which is frequently disputed. David S. Day, The Expanded Concept of Facial
Discrimination in the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 497, 513
(2007). But for those who dislike this high degree of judicial intervention, the solution is
apparently to reject the theory of discriminatory effect altogether—not to require a higher
degree of proof. See id. (explaining that Justices Scalia and Thomas have rejected the
discrimination-in-effect theory largely because it depends on heightened judicial intervention).
136 De minimis means ―[t]rifling,‖ ―minimal,‖ or something ―so insignificant that a court
may overlook it in deciding an issue or case.‖ BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 496 (9th ed. 2009).
Incidental means ―[s]ubordinate to something of greater importance; having a minor role.‖ Id. at
830.
137 See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979) (―[W]e must
inquire . . . whether the challenged statute regulates evenhandedly with only ‗incidental‘ effects
on interstate commerce, or discriminates against interstate commerce.‖).
138 Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331 (1996) (first emphasis added) (quoting Or.
Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep‘t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994)).
139 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
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either discriminatory purpose or discriminatory effect.‖140 Therefore,
it appears that heightened scrutiny should apply if a law is
discriminatory on its face, in its purpose, or in effect. The Granholm
Court accordingly generalized the rule, declaring: ―State laws that
discriminate against interstate commerce face ‗a virtually per se rule
of invalidity.‘‖141 Although the Court has not been crystal clear on
this point, this Note argues that heightened scrutiny should apply to
laws with discriminatory effects because they are just as harmful to
interstate commerce as facially discriminatory laws.
The trickier question is how to determine when a law‘s burdens on
interstate commerce rise to the level of being discriminatory in effect.
More specifically, the issue is whether face-to-face purchase
requirements place only an incidental or a de minimis burden on
interstate commerce or whether the burden is substantial enough to
rise to the level of discrimination. In making that determination, the
First, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits seemed to struggle with the
relevance of the wine industry‘s geographic imbalance and the
nonfungible nature of wine.
Courts should not ignore the wine industry‘s geographic
imbalance; the reality is that the majority of U.S. wineries are located
on the West Coast.142 It is true that ―[t]he costs of a face-to-face
meeting depend on distance, not on borders,‖143 and that ―[d]istance is
not congruent with state lines.‖144 But for Indianans, Kentuckians and
Mainers, the large distance between them and sixty percent of U.S.
wineries is congruent with those wineries being out-of-state. As a
result of their distance from the West Coast, it is much more costly
for residents of these states to purchase a wine in person at most outof-state wineries than at an in-state winery.
The difference is even starker when one realizes that those West
Coast wineries produce ninety-three percent of U.S. wine.145 This
effect should be considered discriminatory. Hunt v. Washington State
Apple Advertising Commission146 established that laws that raise the
cost of doing business for out-of-state producers while leaving in140 Bacchus

Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270 (1984) (citations omitted).
v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 476 (2005) (quoting City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S.

141 Granholm

at 624).
142 As of 2010, almost sixty percent of U.S. wineries were located in California, Oregon, or
Washington. Growth of the U.S. Wine Industry, WINEAMERICA, http://www.wineamerica.org/
newsroom/wine%20data%20center/2010-Growth-of-US-Wine-Industry.pdf (last visited Oct. 16,
2010).
143 Baude v. Heath, 538 F.3d 608, 613 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2382
(2009).
144 Cherry Hill Vineyard, LLC v. Baldacci, 505 F.3d 28, 37 n.7 (1st Cir. 2007).
145 Wiggins, supra note 25, at 1.
146 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
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state producers unaffected are discriminatory in effect.147 One might
argue that this rule does not apply in this situation as the state has not
raised the cost of doing business for any winery, but has instead
created a new direct-shipping market, which is available to both instate and out-of-state wineries. But by restricting this new directshipping market with a face-to-face purchase requirement, the state
ensures that only in-state wineries will have any real chance of doing
business in this new market. The requirement generally makes it too
time consuming and expensive to buy directly from most out-of-state
wineries. The Hunt rule that it is discriminatory to alter an existing
market to make out-of-state goods more costly should be extended to
forbid states from creating new markets that do the same thing.
One might argue that the consumer still has the option of
purchasing out-of-state wine at an in-state retailer instead of traveling
to the winery himself. The wholesale and retail markups will not cost
nearly as much as flying out to the West Coast. Thus, the burden on
interstate commerce is de minimis.
But this reasoning ignores the fact that of the 25,000 wines
produced in the United States, only about 500 make it to retail
shelves.148 If the customer happens to want one of the other 24,500
wines, he must travel to the winery to buy it in person. And as
discussed above, the out-of-state wines in that group of 24,500 will
cost a lot more to obtain than the in-state ones. Therefore when one
considers the geographic imbalance of the wine industry, most states‘
face-to-face purchase requirements are discriminatory in effect—at
least with respect to the group of wineries that do not have stable
national distribution networks.
In a state that borders California, however, it may not cost
significantly more to visit the majority of out-of-state wineries;
therefore, the burden on interstate commerce may be only incidental.
Of California‘s border states, only Arizona has a face-to-face
purchase requirement.149 The Ninth Circuit recently held that
Arizona‘s face-to-face purchase requirement is not discriminatory in
effect without relying on the fact that Arizonans live relatively close
to most out-of-state wineries.150
147 Id.

at 350–51.
supra note 11, at 303.
149 See State Shipping Laws: Arizona, WINE INSTITUTE, http://wineinstitute.shipcompliant.
com/StateDetail.aspx?StateId=31 (last visited Oct. 16, 2010) (summarizing Arizona wine
shipment laws).
150 See Black Star Farms LLC v. Oliver, 600 F.3d 1225, 1234 (9th Cir. 2010) (reading
Granholm as prohibiting only facially discriminatory direct-shipping laws). Because Arizona‘s
face-to-face purchase requirement applies to both in-state and out-of-state wineries, it is not
facially discriminatory and therefore, according to the Ninth Circuit, not unconstitutional. Id.
148 Tanford,
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It is less clear how courts should treat the argument that wine is
not fungible. In Lilly, Kentucky argued that the law‘s effects on
interstate commerce were incidental. It explained that many
Kentuckians live closer to out-of-state wineries located in Kentucky‘s
border states than to in-state wineries. For them, it will actually be
cheaper to visit the out-of-state winery than the in-state winery. In
response, the plaintiffs pointed to both the wine industry‘s geographic
imbalance and wine‘s nonfungibility. The geography argument is that
most wines come from the West Coast, not Kentucky‘s border states.
Therefore, for all Kentuckians, most out-of-state wines are going to
be much more expensive than in-state wines. The nonfungibility
argument is that although some Kentuckians may be closer to out-ofstate wineries than in-state wineries, those are not the wineries they
are buying from; most Kentuckians want to buy specific wines from
the West Coast. The law punishes them for preferring West Coast
wines by raising the cost of those wines. The plaintiffs‘ dual
argument is that most out-of-state wines, and the wines Kentuckians
are actually buying, are much more costly as a result of this law.
The district court responded to this argument by noting, ―[W]ine is
a unique product. Accordingly, we agree with the plaintiffs that ‗it is
false to presume that a wine consumer would purchase from the
closest winery all things being equal‘‖; therefore, ―the defendants‘
argument is flawed.‖151 Essentially, the court recognized that the law
does not make some out-of-state wines cheaper because no one is
buying those wines; they are buying the wines from California. And
because the law has the effect of raising the price of those wines, it is
discriminatory in effect.
It is good that the District Court for the Western District of
Kentucky took into account the reality of which wines Kentuckians
are actually buying. To the extent that the nonfungibility argument
helps highlight that reality, it is beneficial. But even without this fact,
the district court probably still would have found the law to be
discriminatory in effect because it raises the cost of so many out-ofstate wines.
Interestingly, the Baldacci court used the nonfungibility of wine
argument against the plaintiffs. It reasoned that if a customer really
wants a particular out-of-state wine, he will not purchase an in-state
wine just because it is cheaper. The court implied that a law cannot
have a discriminatory effect if it does not actually change people‘s
151 Cherry Hill Vineyards, LLC v. Hudgins, 488 F. Supp. 2d 601, 617 (W.D. Ky. 2006)
(quoting Plaintiff‘s Response to Defendants‘ Supplemental Brief at 7), aff’d sub nom. Cherry
Hill Vineyards, LLC v. Lilly, 553 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 2008).
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behavior.152 But this conclusion ignores the fact that the law
essentially punishes its residents for preferring out-of-state wines by
making those wines more costly than their in-state counterparts.
Moreover, in some situations, the law will induce customers to
change their behavior. For example, if the particular out-of-state wine
that the customer wants is not available at retail, and if he does not
have the time or money to fly to the winery to purchase it, then he
probably will substitute it with a wine that he can buy at home—
either at a nearby in-state winery or at a retailer. Even if he goes to
the retailer and buys another out-of-state wine, an in-state wholesaler
and an in-state retailer have profited from that transaction and the outof-state winery that he wanted to buy from has lost a sale.
This raises the question of whether a court may compare out-ofstate wineries to in-state wholesalers and retailers when determining
discriminatory effect. One might argue that shifting business from
out-of-state wineries to in-state wholesalers is not discriminatory
because ―discrimination assumes a comparison of substantially
similar entities.‖153 But Professor James Tanford has argued that some
laws, while not technically discriminatory, may still violate the
dormant Commerce Clause under the theory of economic
protectionism.
Although the Court occasionally uses economic
protectionism and discrimination interchangeably, the two
concepts are slightly different. . . . [A] law that disadvantages
an out-of-state business for the benefit of an in-state business
of a different type (e.g., out-of-state wineries vs. in-state
wholesalers) is not discriminatory, because the two
businesses are not similarly situated, but it is still
protectionist. 154
Such a law works to ―protect local industry by erecting barriers to
interstate competition.‖155 And the Supreme Court has noted,
―Preservation of local industry by protecting it from the rigors of
152 The Baldacci court also implied that people will not replace their regular trip to the
local liquor store with a trip to a winery because trips to wineries are primarily recreational.
People go to a winery to talk to the winemaker and visit the tasting room, not to do their grocery
shopping. But this argument fails to recognize that for the 24,500 wines not available at retail,
the face-to-face purchase requirement gives the customer only two options: either visit the
winery or don‘t buy the wine.
153 General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 298 (1997) (footnote omitted) (holding in
part that the State‘s differential treatment of public utilities companies and independent
marketers did not violate the Commerce Clause).
154 Tanford, supra note 11, at 282–83.
155 Id. at 282.
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interstate competition is the hallmark of the economic protectionism
that the Commerce Clause prohibits.‖156 But even if courts do not
accept Tanford‘s economic-protectionism argument, they should still
find face-to-face purchase requirements to be discriminatory in most
states for the reasons discussed above. The Baldacci court did not
accept the discriminatory-effect argument because it was looking for
evidence that the law changed people‘s purchasing habits. It seemed
to ignore the fact that under Hunt, a law can be discriminatory in
effect merely by raising the cost of the out-of-state product.
IV. PRODUCTION LIMITS
Two recent cases examined the validity of production limits under
the dormant Commerce Clause: Family Winemakers of California v.
Jenkins157 and Black Star Farms LLC v. Oliver.158 These opinions
raise a number of questions regarding how to prove a discriminatory
purpose, a discriminatory effect, or a Pike undue burden. The fact that
the wine industry is bifurcated (which makes it top heavy)
complicates courts‘ analyses because it is unclear whether, in
determining discriminatory effect, the courts should look at the
amount of wine excluded or the number of wineries excluded by the
production limit. Sections A and B discuss Family Winemakers and
Black Star Farms respectively. Section C proposes which approach
courts should apply to production-limit challenges going forward.
A. Family Winemakers of California v. Jenkins
In Family Winemakers of California v. Jenkins, the plaintiffs
challenged Massachusetts‘s production limit. Prior to 2005,
Massachusetts had a facially discriminatory exception to its three-tier
system that allowed only in-state wineries to sell directly to retailers
and consumers.159 Shortly after Granholm was decided, the District
Court for the District of Massachusetts held this law to be
unconstitutional in Stonington Vineyards, Inc. v. Jenkins.160 In
response to Stonington Vineyards, the Massachusetts legislature
amended the exception so that it excluded wineries based on a
production limit instead of their out-of-state location. The new
156 W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 205 (1994) (holding that a
Massachusetts pricing order was unconstitutional because it created barriers that eliminated the
economic advantages enjoyed by out-of-state milk producers).
157 592 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010).
158 600 F.3d 1225 (9th Cir. 2010).
159 Family Winemakers, 592 F.3d at 7.
160 No. 1:05-cv-10982-JLT (D. Mass. Oct. 5, 2005).
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exception applied to all ―small‖ wineries—those producing no more
than 30,000 gallons of grape wine annually—and allowed them to
combine distribution methods by selling to wholesalers, retailers, and
consumers simultaneously. The legislature also created a new
exception for the remaining ―large‖ wineries. These wineries were
given the choice of selling only to wholesalers (i.e., remaining in the
three-tier system) or selling only to consumers.161 In other words,
unlike the exception for small wineries, the direct-shipping option
available to large wineries did not allow them to continue wholesale
distribution and it authorized direct sales only to consumers, not to
retailers.
The Family Winemakers plaintiffs argued that these new
provisions violated the dormant Commerce Clause. The district court
granted their motion for summary judgment, finding the provisions to
be discriminatory in purpose and effect; the court also noted that even
if the provisions were not discriminatory, they still failed the Pike
balancing test.162 District Court Judge Rya W. Zobel‘s analysis for
each of these findings is worthy of discussion, as are the arguments
Massachusetts advanced on appeal, and the First Circuit‘s selective
clarification of the various issues raised.
1. Discriminatory Purpose
Judge Zobel first addressed the exceptions‘ discriminatory
purpose. In her statement of the facts, Judge Zobel discussed the
history of the bill‘s passage, including damning statements made by
the bill‘s sponsors and Massachusetts winery and wholesaler
lobbyists, who were involved in the drafting process.163 For example,
the wholesaler lobbyists initially argued against allowing any sort of
direct shipping; but once they could see that they were going to lose
that battle, they shifted their focus to arguing for a very low
production limit. In response to this request, the bill was revised to
lower the production limit from 50,000 gallons to 30,000 gallons. At
that point, the owner of Massachusetts‘s largest winery voiced his
concern. Although he currently produced fewer than 30,000 gallons,
he feared that he might surpass the limit in the near future because he
made a lot of apple wine in addition to grape wine.164 The final

161 See

Family Winemakers, 592 F.3d at 7–8.
Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins, No. 06-11682-RWZ, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
112074, *41–42 (D. Mass. Nov. 19, 2008), aff’d, 592 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010).
163 See id. at *13–22.
164 Id. at *15–16.
162 Family
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version of the bill kept the 30,000-gallon production limit but
provided that only grape wine would count toward that limit.165
During debate in the Massachusetts Senate, Senator Morrissey
pointed out that Massachusetts wholesalers were protected because
most wine would still go through the three-tier system because the
―choice‖ given to ―large‖ wineries was really a false one. He
reasoned, ―[Y]ou got to think they are going to go with the wholesaler
because they can‘t move that much wine. So they are going to use the
wholesale market. So it‘s a very small percentage [of wineries which
may choose direct sales over wholesalers]. But we give them a
choice.‖166 He also observed, ―[I]ronically, with the limitations that
we are suggesting in the legislation, we are really still giving an
inherent advantage indirectly to the local wineries.‖167 This
observation alludes to the fact that 100% of Massachusetts wine is
made by ―small‖ wineries that can take advantage of the economic
benefits of direct shipping, whereas ninety-eight percent of out-ofstate wine is produced by ―large‖ wineries, which will most likely
have to use a Massachusetts wholesaler to reach the Massachusetts
market.168
Judge Zobel felt that Senator Morrissey‘s comments and the events
leading up to the bill‘s passage supported the plaintiffs‘ argument that
the exceptions were ―designed to allow all in-state wineries to
continue direct shipping while forcing the majority of interstate wine
to go through the three-tier system, thereby preserving the economic
interests of both Massachusetts wholesalers and Massachusetts
wineries.‖169 She seemed to place the most weight on the inexplicable
exemption of nongrape wine, the false choice given to ―large‖
wineries, and Senator Morrissey‘s comment about indirectly
advantaging in-state wineries.170 She rejected Massachusetts‘s
argument that the purpose of the exemptions was to level the playing
field for small wineries, which have historically had difficulty
obtaining wholesaler representation. But Judge Zobel did not fully
articulate her reason for rejecting this argument, stating only that ―it
does not logically follow that aiding ‗small‘ wineries must be done at
the expense of burdening ‗large‘ wineries with the more onerous
requirements of § 19F(a) [the provision forcing large wineries to
choose between the three-tier system or direct shipping only to
165 Id.

at *10.
at *20 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
167 Id. at *21 (internal quotation marks omitted).
168 See id. at *34.
169 Id. at *27–28.
170 See id. at *20–21.
166 Id.
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consumers].‖171 Judge Zobel‘s explanation is problematic because it
does not actually explain why Massachusetts‘s asserted purpose is not
legitimate; instead, it seems to implicitly attack the three-tier system
itself by arguing that the liberal small-winery exemption should be
extended to all wineries because large wineries are also burdened
when forced to sell only to wholesalers.
On appeal, the First Circuit upheld the district court‘s finding of
discriminatory purpose, but only after discussing and upholding the
finding of discriminatory effect.172 In discussing discriminatory
purpose, the First Circuit relied on the test it had developed in
Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers v. Gwadosky.173 The Alliance
of Automobile Manufacturers test focuses on the statute as a whole,
including its language, context, and legislative history; but it also
considers whether the statute is closely tailored to achieve the
purported legislative purpose.174 Although Massachusetts‘s
production-limit provisions did not contain a stated statutory purpose,
the court found other evidence of discriminatory purpose on which to
base its holding. First, the new provisions were codified near other
statutory exceptions to Massachusetts‘s three-tier system, many of
which did explicitly state that their purpose was to assist
Massachusetts industries, such as breweries and distilleries. Second,
the legislators‘ statements evidenced an intent to benefit the local
wine industry. And third, the fact that the provisions were
discriminatory in effect undercut the argument that they were
motivated by a nondiscriminatory purpose.175
Interestingly, the court stressed that its finding of discriminatory
purpose was ―not dependent on the many statements of discriminatory
purpose by lobbyists and the intermediate steps in the legislative
process the district court relied upon in its opinion.‖176 It is unclear
why the First Circuit shunned these factors; at the district court level,
Judge Zobel explained their relevance by quoting from Edwards v.
Aguillard.177
The plain meaning of the statute‘s words, enlightened by their
context and the contemporaneous legislative history, can
control the determination of legislative purpose. Moreover, in
determining the legislative purpose of a statute, the Court has
171 Id.

at *32.
Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins, 592 F.3d 1, 10, 13 (1st Cir. 2010).
173 430 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2005).
174 Family Winemakers, 592 F.3d at 13.
175 Id. at 14.
176 Id. at 17 n.22.
177 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
172 Family
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also considered the historical context of the statute and the
specific sequence of events leading to passage of the
statute.178
In fact, in Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, the First Circuit
itself declared that ―context is a critically important interpretive tool,‖
and cited Edwards v. Aguillard.179 In any case, whatever the factors,
the First Circuit came to the same conclusion as the district court—
that the production limit was discriminatory in purpose.
The First Circuit more clearly explained why Massachusetts‘s
asserted purpose (to level the playing field for small wineries) was
questionable. The selection of a 30,000-gallon grape-wine production
limit has no apparent correlation to the goal of helping small wineries.
The wine industry defines small wineries as those producing fewer
than 120,000 gallons annually of any type of wine, not just grape
wine. The federal government gives tax breaks to wineries producing
250,000 gallons or fewer annually of any type of wine. Of the other
states that have adopted production limits, none has chosen 30,000
gallons as its cutoff and none has exempted nongrape wine.
Moreover, if the goal is to help those wineries that struggle to find
wholesaler representation, then almost all wineries should be included
because only the largest fifty to 100 wineries in the United States are
able to distribute most of their wines through wholesalers.180 What the
30,000-gallon grape-wine limit does correlate to is the makeup of the
Massachusetts wine industry. All thirty-one of Massachusetts‘s
wineries produce between 200 and 24,000 gallons of grape wine
annually. Significantly, Massachusetts‘s largest winery has produced
more than 30,000 gallons of wine in past years, but between half and
three-quarters of that was apple wine.181 Given these facts, the court
did not believe Massachusetts that the true purpose of the provision
was to help small wineries.
The First Circuit‘s discussion of discriminatory purpose, however,
left two important questions unanswered: what the proper test for
discriminatory purpose in the context of dormant Commerce Clause
challenges is and whether a finding of discriminatory purpose on its
own is sufficient to trigger heightened scrutiny. First, the court chose
to use its own discriminatory-purpose test without any justification. In
178 Family Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins, No. 06-11682-RWZ, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
112074, at *26–27 (D. Mass. Nov. 19, 2008) (quoting Edwards, 482 U.S. at 594 (citations
omitted)), aff’d, 592 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010).
179 Alliance of Auto. Mfrs. v. Gwadosky, 430 F.3d 30, 37 (1st Cir. 2005).
180 Family Winemakers, 592 F.3d at 12, 15–16.
181 Id. at 16–17.
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a footnote, the court admitted that other courts have looked to a wider
range of factors than those listed in Alliance of Automobile
Manufacturers and that some have even used the discriminatorypurpose test laid out in Equal Protection Clause cases. But instead of
giving a reasoned basis for rejecting those tests, the court merely
decided that because it found that Massachusetts‘s production limit
had a discriminatory purpose under the narrower Alliance of
Automobile Manufacturers test, it need not look to other factors or
consider whether Equal Protection analysis is appropriate in the
Commerce Clause context.182
Second, the court made a conscious choice to affirm the district
court‘s finding of discriminatory effect before reaching the question
of discriminatory purpose. Then, after finding discriminatory purpose
as well, the court reasoned that ―when . . . a state statute is both
discriminatory in effect and in purpose, it is clearly discriminatory
within the meaning of the Commerce Clause, and we need not
address whether evidence of a legislative intent to discriminate would
suffice on its own.‖183 The First Circuit had sidestepped this question
in Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers as well. In that decision, it
noted that despite Bacchus‘s assertion that ―[a] finding that state
legislation constitutes ‗economic protectionism‘ may be made on the
basis of either discriminatory purpose or discriminatory effect,‖184
there is still some doubt as to ―whether a showing of discriminatory
purpose alone will invariably suffice to support a finding of
constitutional invalidity under the dormant Commerce Clause.‖185
It is unfortunate that the sufficiency of discriminatory purpose
remains an open question because it is at the heart of the problem.
After the Granholm decision, states with [facially]
discriminatory laws on their books had to make a choice: they
could either ―level up‖ by extending direct-shipping
privileges to out-of-state wineries, or ―level down‖ by
revoking such privileges from in-state wineries. The good
news for competition and consumers is that to date no state
has leveled down by completely prohibiting wine direct
shipping. The bad news is that several states that nominally
leveled up have moved ―sideways‖ by levying new
restrictions—including on-site purchase requirements and
182 Id.

at 13–14 & n.15.
at 14 n.16.
184 Alliance of Auto. Mfrs., 430 F.3d at 36 (emphasis added) (quoting Bacchus Imps., Ltd.
v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
185 Id. at 36 n.3.
183 Id.
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production limitations—on direct shipping, which typically
fall more heavily on out-of-state producers. In some cases,
such restrictions effectively make direct shipping by out-ofstate wineries economically impossible.186
It seems highly likely that these states moved ―sideways‖ in an
attempt to retain as much of the in-state advantage as possible while
avoiding constitutional challenges under Granholm. This is exactly
what Massachusetts did when it transformed its facially
discriminatory direct-shipping law into a facially neutral (but still
discriminatory) production limit after Stonington Vineyards. Because
it is highly likely that many of these post-Granholm provisions were
passed with a discriminatory purpose, and because courts are not
applying the discriminatory-effect test consistently, it is important to
clarify the proper test for discriminatory purpose and to determine
whether a finding of discriminatory purpose alone is sufficient to
trigger heightened scrutiny.
2. Discriminatory Effect
Determining whether a production limit is discriminatory in effect
is difficult for several reasons. First, the Baldacci court proclaimed
that plaintiffs must provide substantial evidence of discriminatory
effect, but it is unclear what exactly that means. Second, it is unclear
how courts should measure the burden that these laws place on
interstate commerce. Part of that uncertainty stems from the fact that
the U.S. wine industry is very top heavy. Under Massachusetts‘s
scheme, only eleven percent of all U.S. wineries were excluded from
the liberal small-winery direct-shipping provision; but those eleven
percent account for ninety-eight percent of U.S. wine production.187
The plaintiffs argued that the scheme was discriminatory in effect
because it allowed 100% of Massachusetts‘s wine to be shipped
directly while essentially preventing ninety-eight percent of out-ofstate wine from being shipped directly. Massachusetts argued that the
production limit was not discriminatory because it allowed eightynine percent of all wineries in the country to ship directly to
Massachusetts, and most of those wineries are located outside of
Massachusetts.188 Judge Zobel adopted the plaintiffs‘ interpretation,
pointing to Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland‘s189 pronouncement
186 Ohlhausen

& Luib, supra note 24, at 506 (footnote omitted).
Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins, No. 06-11682-RWZ, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
112074, at *23 (D. Mass. Nov. 19, 2008), aff’d, 592 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010).
188 Id. at *33–34.
189 437 U.S. 117 (1978) (holding that a Maryland law prohibiting producers or refiners
187 Family
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that ―the [Commerce] Clause protects the interstate market, not
particular interstate firms, from prohibitive or burdensome
regulations.‖190 The Exxon Court meant that just because a few outof-state businesses are burdened by a law does not mean that it is
unconstitutional because the relevant inquiry is whether the interstate
market as a whole is burdened. Interestingly, Family Winemakers
presents the opposite situation; most out-of-state wineries are not
burdened by the production limit, but the group that is burdened
accounts for ninety-eight percent of the market.
The First Circuit affirmed the district court‘s finding of
discriminatory effect. It claimed to uphold this finding under the same
substantial-evidence standard it used in Baldacci. The First Circuit
noted that in Baldacci, the plaintiffs had conceded that Maine‘s faceto-face requirement was nondiscriminatory in purpose; therefore,
Baldacci had not addressed ―whether a lesser showing might suffice
when a law is allegedly discriminatory in both effect and purpose.‖191
The court did not address this issue in Family Winemakers either
because it was able to find that Massachusetts‘s scheme was
discriminatory in effect even under the higher Baldacci standard.
The First Circuit noted that Massachusetts‘s scheme confers a
clear competitive advantage on small wineries, which include all
Massachusetts wineries, and places large wineries, all of which are
out-of-state, at a comparative disadvantage. The court emphasized
that even though the small-winery exemption is available to
thousands of out-of-state wineries, only twenty-six have actually
applied for Massachusetts‘s small-winery license. In contrast, twentyseven of Massachusetts‘s thirty-one wineries have applied for the
license. Additionally, those twenty-seven in-state wineries actually
benefit from the license; in 2007, they made seventy-one percent of
their sales through the alternative outlets created in the small-winery
exemption provision.192 This evidence helped the court distinguish
Baldacci. This is evidence that Massachusetts wineries actually
benefit from the law. In contrast, the Baldacci plaintiffs produced no
evidence that people actually visit Maine wineries and purchase
wine.193
The court also emphasized that the exemptions did not do what
Massachusetts claimed they were meant to do: level the playing field

from operating retail service stations within the State does not violate the Due Process Clause).
190 Id. at 127–28, quoted in Family Winemakers, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112074, at *33.
191 Family Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins, 592 F.3d 1, 11 n.11 (1st Cir. 2010).
192 Id. at 11 & n.12.
193 Id. at 12 n.13.
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for wineries that do not have stable wholesaler representation. On the
contrary, many wineries that qualify as ―large‖ under Massachusetts‘s
scheme are not large enough to obtain stable wholesaler
representation, so they are put at a particular disadvantage—they
cannot fully function in the three-tier system and they cannot use the
liberal direct-shipping provision either.194
Massachusetts responded by arguing that Granholm applies only
to facially discriminatory laws. In other words, the Twenty-First
Amendment still protects laws that are merely discriminatory in
purpose or effect.195 Presumably, Massachusetts meant that its
production limit should be upheld despite its discriminatory effect and
purpose because it advanced core Twenty-First Amendment concerns.
But the Commonwealth did not say this explicitly or even allude to
which core concerns it thought the production limit promoted. The
First Circuit noted that it is unclear whether the core-concerns
balancing test survived Granholm; but it went on to hold, ―[T]he
Twenty-first Amendment does not exempt facially neutral state
alcohol laws with discriminatory effects from the non-discrimination
rule of the Commerce Clause. Nor, of course, are such laws exempt
when they also discriminate by design.‖196 This holding does not
extend the Granholm rule; instead, it simply recognizes that it would
be illogical to interpret Granholm as applying only to facially
discriminatory laws. The First Circuit essentially clarified that the
core-concerns test can no longer be applied to discriminatory laws.197
The remaining question is whether the core-concerns test is still
relevant to the Pike analysis.
3. Pike Balancing Test
Judge Zobel concluded her analysis of Massachusetts‘s directshipping scheme by noting that even if the exceptions were not
discriminatory in purpose or effect, they would still fail the Pike
balancing test. Under Massachusetts‘s scheme, large wineries
effectively may sell only to wholesalers. Such restrictions burden
interstate commerce. She felt that the scheme served no local
benefit.198 Even if one accepts Massachusetts‘s argument that the
194 See

id. at 12.
at 18–19.
196 Id. at 20–21.
197 One could argue that the First Circuit‘s holding left some room to apply the coreconcerns test to laws that are discriminatory only in purpose. This is just another way of
phrasing the question the court raised earlier—that is, whether a finding of discriminatory
purpose alone is sufficient to invoke heightened scrutiny.
198 Family Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins, No. 06-11682-RWZ, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
195 Id.
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scheme helps small wineries nationwide, she felt that this goal would
not be undercut by allowing the large wineries to ship directly as
well.199
On appeal, Massachusetts argued that the Twenty-First
Amendment and the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts foreclose the
plaintiffs‘ claim under Pike and that Granholm supports this
position.200 Indeed, Gregory Durkin has argued that Granholm should
be interpreted as establishing that nondiscriminatory state laws
regulating alcohol and closely advancing a core concern of the
Twenty-First Amendment cannot be invalidated under Pike.201 But the
First Circuit declined to address this issue, stating that because it
found the laws to be discriminatory in effect and in purpose, it did not
need to decide whether the Twenty-First Amendment immunizes
nondiscriminatory laws that fail the Pike balancing test.202
B. Black Star Farms, LLC v. Oliver
In Black Star Farms, LLC v. Oliver, the plaintiffs challenged the
production-limit exception to Arizona‘s three-tier system.203 The
exception allows wineries producing fewer than 20,000 gallons of
wine annually to ship an unlimited amount of wine directly to all
Arizona customers and retailers. Twenty-six of Arizona‘s twentyseven wineries produce fewer than 20,000 gallons of wine
annually.204 The plaintiffs argued that this exception discriminates
against the hundreds of out-of-state wineries that produce more than
20,000 gallons of wine annually because those wineries are
essentially forced to go through Arizona‘s three-tier system and
endure wholesaler markups, whereas all but one of Arizona‘s
wineries are completely exempt from the three-tier system, giving
them preferential access to Arizona customers.205
The district court rejected this argument. It reasoned that
preferential access implies that in-state wineries benefit to the
exclusion of out-of-state wineries, which is not what the production

112074, at *41 (D. Mass. Nov. 19, 2008), aff’d, 592 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010).
199 Id. at *41–42.
200 The Commonwealth pointed out that although Baude v. Heath applied Pike to an
alcohol regulation, it apparently did so without any objection from the parties. Reply Brief of
Appellants at 26–27, Family Winemakers, 592 F.3d 1 (No. 09-1169).
201 See Durkin, supra note 63, at 1108 n.72.
202 Family Winemakers, 592 F.3d at 19 n.27.
203 Black Star Farms LLC v. Oliver, 544 F. Supp. 2d 913, 916 (D. Ariz. 2008), aff’d, 600
F.3d 1225 (9th Cir. 2010).
204 Id. at 917.
205 Id. at 918.
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limit does. More than half of all U.S. wineries produce fewer than
20,000 gallons of wine annually and are therefore eligible for directshipping privileges in Arizona. Given that only twenty-six of these
eligible wineries are in Arizona, the benefits of this privilege go
mainly to out-of-state wineries.206
The mere fact that all but one of the excluded wineries happen to
be out-of-state does not mean that the law is discriminatory in
effect.207 The court analogized this situation to Minnesota v. Clover
Leaf Creamery Co.208 In Clover Leaf Creamery, the Supreme Court
upheld a Minnesota law that prohibited the sale of milk in plastic
nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers, but permitted sales in other
nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers, such as paperboard milk
cartons.209 The Black Star Farms court latched onto the similarity that
the Minnesota law benefited the paper industry, which consisted of
both in-state and out-of-state companies, and burdened the plastics
industry, which consisted entirely of out-of-state companies.210
As a result, the Black Star Farms court wanted the plaintiffs to
present substantial evidence showing that the production limit had the
effect of increasing in-state wineries‘ proportional share of the
market.211 The court noted that showing that some out-of-state
wineries missed out on sales is not sufficient.
[S]urely out-of-state wineries are subject to lost sales under
the ―unquestionably legitimate‖ three-tiered distribution
system [as well]. Lost sales are troublesome . . . only to the
extent that a state‘s statutory scheme is designed to favor instate wineries, such that in-state wineries are able to gain a
greater share of the market.212
The court concluded that although the production limit does
effectively prevent some out-of-state wineries from shipping directly
to Arizona consumers, ―those wineries may still gain access to
[Arizona] consumers through the State‘s three-tiered distribution
system.‖213 Therefore, the plaintiffs cannot show that the production
206 Id.

at 926.
id. at 918, 926.
208 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
209 Id. at 458 n.1, 474.
210 See Black Star Farms, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 923–24.
211 See id. at 927. The court did not say whether it took this ―substantial evidence‖ standard
from Baldacci. But on appeal, the attorney for the State urged the Ninth Circuit to adopt the
Baldacci standard. See Oral Argument at 19:57, Black Star Farms LLC v. Oliver, 600 F.3d 1225
(9th Cir. 2010) (No. 08-15738), available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_subpage
.php?pk_id=0000003915.
212 Black Star Farms, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 927.
213 Id. at 928.
207 See
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limit ―somehow alter[s] the proportional share of the State‘s wine
market in favor of in-state wineries.‖214 The fact that more out-ofstate wineries than in-state wineries are required to use the three-tier
system does not establish a discriminatory effect. ―That fact at best
supports the contention that Arizona‘s statutory scheme places an
incidental burden on interstate commerce.‖215 But the court declined
to analyze whether the law‘s burdens outweigh its benefits because
the plaintiffs had not challenged the law under Pike.216
On appeal the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court‘s holding
that the exception was not discriminatory in effect.217 The court
framed the issue as ―whether Arizona‘s statutory scheme for
regulating the shipment of wine to consumers has the practical effect
of ‗favor[ing] in-state economic interests over out-of-state
interests.‘‖218 The court adopted Baldacci‘s substantial-evidence
standard and concluded that the plaintiffs failed to provide substantial
evidence that the exception has an actual adverse effect on interstate
commerce.219 On the contrary, almost twice as many out-of-state
wineries as in-state wineries have obtained the direct-shipping
license.220
Black Star Farms may have had better luck if it had argued that the
production limit was also discriminatory in purpose. Prior to
Granholm v. Heald, Arizona had a facially discriminatory smallwinery exception. Wineries that produced no more than 75,000
gallons of wine annually were eligible for direct-shipping privileges,
but only if seventy-five percent of their wine was produced from
grapes grown in Arizona.221 After Granholm, the Arizona legislature
revised the law so that it would be nondiscriminatory and in
conformance with Granholm. But instead of merely removing the
requirement that seventy-five percent of the grapes come from
Arizona, the legislature also lowered the production limit from 75,000
gallons to 20,000 gallons.222 The only apparent purpose of lowering
the production limit is to exclude as many out-of-state wineries as
possible while still allowing in-state wineries to ship directly. In fact,
214 Id.
215 Id.

at 927.
at 928.

216 Id.
217 Black
218 Id.

Star Farms, LLC v. Oliver, 600 F.3d 1225, 1230–31 (9th Cir. 2010).
at 1231 (alteration in original) (quoting Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 487

(2005)).
219 See id. (agreeing with the district court‘s conclusion that the plaintiff failed to meet its
burden of offering substantial evidence of an actual discriminatory effect).
220 Id. at 1232.
221 Id. at 1228.
222 Id.
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Senator Ken Cheuvront, who sponsored the bill that lowered the
production limit, admitted that the production limit was ―chosen by
the legislature in order to ‗take care of‘ the Arizona wineries and
protect their economic viability. Senator Cheuvront . . . testified that
‗the specific purpose of the new legislation . . . was to secure that the
Arizona wineries were included except Kokopelli and thus permit
them to ship in-state.‘‖223 Unfortunately, Black Star Farms did not
pursue the discriminatory-purpose argument on appeal, reasoning that
―it does not matter if the legislature had protectionist intent, because a
finding that state legislation constitutes economic protectionism may
be made on the basis of either discriminatory purpose or
discriminatory effect.‖224
C. Proposed Analysis of Production Limits
One of the questions that arise when analyzing the constitutionality
of a production limit is whether to focus on the amount of out-of-state
wine excluded or the number of out-of-state wineries excluded. The
First and Ninth Circuits‘ analyses differed in this respect. The Family
Winemakers court focused on the fact that Massachusetts‘s
production limit excluded ninety-eight percent of out-of-state wine.
The Black Star Farms court focused on the fact that Arizona‘s
production limit excluded fewer than half of out-of-state wineries.
Focusing on the number of wineries, however, obscures the fact that
the U.S. wine industry is very top heavy and geographically
unbalanced. California, Oregon, and Washington wineries alone
account for ninety-three percent of U.S. wine production.225
Consequently, any state other than California, Oregon or Washington
can draft a direct-shipping provision that is available to most out-ofstate wineries while at the same time excluding almost all out-of-state
wine. Therefore, in order to take into account the realities of the wine
industry, courts should focus on the amount of out-of-state wine
excluded by a production limit—not the number of wineries.
But even if the Ninth Circuit had taken this approach, it likely still
would have concluded that Arizona‘s production limit is not
discriminatory in effect. Even though the production limit excludes
the vast majority of out-of-state wine, some out-of-state wine can
223 Opening Brief of Appellants at 11, Black Star Farms, 600 F.3d 1225 (No. 08-15738),
2009 WL 2444182 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting Cheuvront Affidavit ¶¶ 7–8).
Kokopelli is the only Arizona winery that produces more than 20,000 gallons of wine annually.
It has wholesaler representation and does not desire to ship directly to customers. Id. at 11 n.5.
224 Black Star Farms, 600 F.3d at 1230 (emphasis added) (quoting Reply Brief of
Appellants at 24, 2009 WL 2444186) (internal quotation marks omitted).
225 Wiggins, supra note 25, at 1.
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benefit from the exception. In fact, most of the wine that can benefit
from the law will be from out-of-state; only twenty-seven of the
thousands of ―small‖ wineries in the United States are located in
Arizona. Therefore, the exception does not benefit solely—or even
mostly—in-state wine.
The second question that arises is how to determine whether a
production limit ―burdens‖ out-of-state economic interests. The First
Circuit found that the ―large‖ wineries, all of which were out-of-state,
were burdened because no matter which option they chose (selling
only to wholesalers or selling only to consumers), they would lose
sales compared to the small wineries, which could combine all three
distribution methods. Essentially, the First Circuit analyzed
Massachusetts‘s alcohol distribution scheme as a whole and
concluded that the three-tier system plus its exceptions benefited all
in-state wine and burdened virtually all out-of-state wine. By contrast,
the Ninth Circuit analyzed only the production-limit provision. It
concluded that the exception did not burden the ―large‖ wineries
because it did not put any new requirements on them. The large
wineries could still sell only to wholesalers, as was the case before the
exception existed. While the Ninth Circuit‘s approach seems myopic,
it avoids the conclusion that the three-tier system as a whole is
discriminatory in effect. That would be an uncomfortable conclusion
for a court of appeals to reach given that the Granholm Court
emphasized that the three-tier system remains unquestionably
legitimate.226
While considering a state‘s entire alcohol distribution scheme in
light of the realities of the U.S. wine market seems to be the more
logical approach, courts may decline to follow the First Circuit to
avoid having to find the three-tier system discriminatory in effect. But
even if courts follow the Ninth Circuit‘s discriminatory-effect
analysis, they could still find production limits to be discriminatory in
purpose. Unless a state‘s production limit reflects the volume at
which a winery can achieve stable wholesale distribution, it is
probably discriminatory in purpose. The only reason to set the limit
any lower than that is to exclude midsize out-of-state wineries that
might otherwise compete with the state‘s small wineries in the directshipping market. Because the use of a low production limit is clearly
an attempt to sidestep Granholm, the discriminatory-purpose test is an
important tool for direct-shipping advocates. Consequently, it is
226 This is essentially what the Family Winemakers court held, but the First Circuit
obfuscated the holding by referring to ―§ 19F‖ when in reality it was discussing the effects of
Massachusetts‘s three-tier system as a whole. See Family Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins, 592
F.3d 1, 11–12 (1st Cir. 2010).
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unfortunate that the Family Winemakers court did not clarify the test
for discriminatory purpose nor address whether discriminatory
purpose alone could trigger heightened scrutiny.
DIGESTIF
Going forward, courts should follow the examples set by the
District Court for the Southern District of Indiana in Baude v. Heath,
the Sixth Circuit in Cherry Hill Vineyards, LLC v. Lilly, and the First
Circuit in Family Winemakers of California v. Jenkins—that is, to
give proper weight to the realities of the wine industry when
considering the constitutionality of narrow direct-shipping exceptions
to states‘ three-tier systems. One of the realities that should be
confronted is that the vast majority of U.S. wines do not make it
through the three-tier system to retail shelves. Given that fact, it
becomes hard not to question whether the three-tier system as a whole
remains constitutional.
Although the Granhom Court pronounced that the three-tier
system remains unquestionably legitimate, ―there is good reason to
doubt the efficacy of such boilerplate language.‖227 Professor Tanford
argues that the three-tier system is the quintessential dormant
Commerce Clause violation: it ―closes the market to most out-of-state
wineries, serves no public interest, and economically benefits only the
wholesalers.‖228 Tanford also argues that the Twenty-First
Amendment does not save the three-tier system because it was meant
only to ―give states power to regulate local production and sale within
their borders, and to prohibit interstate commerce in violation of local
dry laws.‖229 The Granholm Court itself emphasized that the TwentyFirst Amendment does not supersede the dormant Commerce
Clause.230 Tanford has concluded,
One cannot realistically argue that the Twenty-First
Amendment gave wet states the power to erect trade barriers
that prevent nonresidents from selling wine, to give
preferential access to the market to local wine sellers, or to
protect the economic interest of in-state wholesalers. That is
227 Tanford,

supra note 11, at 329.
The reason states‘ three-tier systems close the market only to most out-of-state
wineries is that most wineries are in California and California does not have a three-tier system,
therefore, there is no state with a three-tier system that acts to exclude mostly in-state wineries.
See Wiggins, supra note 25, at 1.
229 Tanford, supra note 11, at 330.
230 Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 486 (2005) (―[T]he Twenty-first Amendment does
not supersede other provisions of the Constitution and, in particular, does not displace the rule
that the States may not give a discriminatory preference to their own producers.‖).
228 Id.
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what the three-tier system does, and Granholm suggests that
its days may be numbered.231
Professor Tanford makes some good observations in support of his
argument that the three-tier system is no longer constitutional, but he
does not invoke the nonfungibility of wine as part this attack. Given
that at least two courts have considered wine‘s uniqueness when
analyzing exceptions to states‘ three-tier systems, one wonders
whether the nonfungibility argument could bolster the more ambitious
claim that the three-tier system itself is unconstitutional. In other
words, can we attack the three-tier system with terroir?
The claim is that because each wine—and each of our palates232—
is unique, a system in which the wholesalers dictate which wines we
may have access to is unacceptable. This argument may have less to
do with how a state‘s three-tier system burdens interstate commerce
and more to do with how it burdens the state‘s own consumers. It
helps explain why wine consumers find restrictions on wine
distribution to be unfair; if a consumer cannot purchase the wine he
wants, there is literally nothing he can replace it with that will taste
the same. And this is not trivial because ―[w]ine does not just give
pleasure. It is . . . a product which has a substantial and far-ranging
symbolic significance.‖233 Terroir is an important part of this
significance. For example, it embodies ―a collective taste memory,
which has matured over a long time, through several generations of
people . . . .‖234 Terroir helps explain why wine is culturally
important. Of course, it also means that the wine industry can produce
an endless supply of different wines to sell, which makes the industry
economically important.235 It is an industry that we should try to
foster, not unquestioningly restrict because the Rehnquist Court said
that was okay in a plurality opinion from twenty years ago.236

231 Tanford,

supra note 11, at 330.
first thing you should consider after you‘ve tasted a wine is whether or not you
like it. Is it your style? . . . The definition of a good wine is one that you enjoy. I cannot
emphasize this enough. Trust your own palate and do not let others dictate taste to you!‖ ZRALY,
supra note 3, at 13.
233 STEVE CHARTERS, WINE AND SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CONTEXT OF A
DRINK 5 (2006).
234 Id. at 107 (quoting Emmanuelle Vaudour, The Quality of Grapes and Wine in Relation
to Geography: Notions of Terroir at Various Scales, 13 J. WINE RESEARCH 121 (2002))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
235 In 2005, the retail value of U.S. wines totaled $23.8 billion. Barbara Insel, The U.S.
Wine Industry, 43 BUS. ECON. 68, 68 (2008).
236 See North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1990) (plurality opinion)
(describing North Dakota‘s three-tier system as ―unquestionably legitimate‖).
232 ―The
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Of course, when criticizing these undesirable effects of the threetier system, one must not lose sight of the fact that some of them were
actually intended. Alcohol is a commodity that provides
many acceptable outcomes [but] at the same time can be the
cause[] of tremendous social strife. . . . [T]he challenge for
government is to provide a realistic system for its
accessibility while at the same time attempting to limit its
abusive consumption through controlled access. . . .
The present regulatory scheme in some states requires a
minimum markup price for wholesale and retail tiers. The
intention here is not to guarantee a profit to wholesale and
retailers at the expense of the consumer, but to maintain
alcohol at a certain price level so that it cannot become too
cheap and therefore easily accessible. . . .
Deregulators looking at this relationship through a lens of
pure economic theory miss the . . . proposition of intentional
fractionalization using a middle tier as the monopoly. . . .
State laws that may appear to make no sense in an ordinary
economic model . . . are easily understood within the context
of what was intended in 1933, and now need[] to be analyzed
from a 21st amendment perspective instead of an economic
one.237
Although it is true that one must be sensitive to the safety and
public-health concerns surrounding alcohol consumption, it is also
important to recognize that the goal is to have a realistic system for
accessibility. Instead, over the past few decades, the current system
has become a ―three-tier non-distribution system.‖238 The explosion of
small producers, the consolidation of the wholesale tier, and the rise
of the Internet and e-commerce have combined to make the current
regime inadequate. Significantly, California, Oregon, and
Washington, which collectively account for ninety-three percent of
U.S. wine production, have all abandoned the three-tier system in
favor of a two-tier system in which retailers can purchase directly
from producers.239 They also all allow direct shipping without any
face-to-face purchase requirements or production limits.240 Even with
237 Carole L. Jurkiewicz & Murphy J. Painter, Why We Control Alcohol the Way We Do, in
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONTROL OF ALCOHOL 7–9 (Carole L. Jurkiewicz & Murphy J. Painter
eds., 2008) (citation omitted).
238 Tanford, supra note 11, at 303.
239 Wiggins, supra note 25, at 1.
240 See State Shipping Laws Map, WINE INSTITUTE, http://wineinstitute.shipcompliant
.com/Home.aspx?SaleTypeID=1 (last visited Oct. 16, 2010).
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these liberalizations, there are still ways to limit abusive consumption.
For example, Oregon limits the number of cases a customer can
purchase directly from a winery.241 These states serve as examples of
how to evolve beyond the three-tier system in a responsible way.
As the Wine Wars continue, direct-shipping advocates should
emphasize wine‘s nonfungibility and its cultural significance as well
as the economic importance of the wine industry. Using California,
Oregon, and Washington as examples, states should modernize their
alcohol distribution systems in ways that responsibly foster the wine
industry as a whole, not just their local wineries.
ALEXANDRA THOMPSON†

241 See State Shipping Laws: Oregon, WINE INSTITUTE, http://wineinstitute.shipcompliant
.com/StateDetail.aspx?StateId=15 (last visited Oct. 16, 2010) (summarizing Oregon wine
shipment laws).In reality this might do little to curb alcohol abuse. Even with access to only one
bottle of wine, one can drink an excessive amount. States cannot really limit consumers‘ access
to alcohol enough to stop abusive consumption. To stop abusive consumption, states need to
focus on things like education and effective enforcement of drunk-driving laws.
† J.D. Candidate, 2011, Case Western Reserve University School of Law.

